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CLIO ON STEROIDS: HISTORICAL
SILENCE AS A PRESUMPTION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
“We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must
remember that for our purposes our only interest in the past is for
the light it throws upon the present.” – Oliver Wendell Holmes 1
INTRODUCTION
Since March 23, 2010, political pundits have inundated us with
rhetoric that either demonizes or defends Congress and the Obama
Administration’s recent overhaul of the healthcare industry through
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2 (“PPACA”). Most of
the debate revolves around section 1501, which requires, with limited
exceptions, all Americans to purchase and maintain a minimum
amount of health insurance or pay a penalty. 3 Section 1501 has
become known as the “individual mandate.” 4 The breadth of the
individual mandate, whether couched in Congress’s power to regulate
commerce 5 or to tax and spend for the general welfare, 6 is arguably
unprecedented. 7 Indeed, the law’s opponents forcefully assert that it is
an unprecedented and therefore an unconstitutional expansion of
federal power. 8 Proponents argue that those claims do not withstand
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897).
Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3 Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 242 (2010).
4 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 n.2 (E.D. Mich.
2010) (“The term ‘Individual Mandate’ in the pleadings and in this opinion refers to the
minimum coverage provision of the Act which requires that all private citizens maintain
minimum essential coverage under penalty of federal law.”), aff’d 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States ”).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to “provide for the . . .
general Welfare of the United States”).
7 See infra note 403 for a discussion of historical facts that are asserted as precedent for
the individual mandate.
8 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Op-Ed, The Insurance Mandate in Peril, WALL ST. J., Apr.
1
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scrutiny. 9 And the federal government, defending section 1501 in
court, dismissed the so-called “unprecedented argument” 10 as “empty
rhetoric, not a legal test.” 11
The government’s pithy dismissal, however, may be equally
rhetorical. At least some federal judges who have reviewed the
individual mandate’s constitutionality have been more sympathetic to
the unprecedented argument. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, finding the individual mandate beyond
Congress’s power, noted, “[t]he fact that Congress has never before
exercised this supposed authority is telling.” 12 And Senior United

29, 2010, at A19 (noting that “[s]uch a claim of power is literally unprecedented”); Terence P.
Jeffrey,
A
Tyrannical
Act,
HUMAN
EVENTS
(Mar.
24,
2010),
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=36178 (noting the following exchange with
Senator Orrin Hatch, the senior Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee: “‘If that
[individual mandate] is held constitutional—for them to be able to tell us we have to purchase
health insurance—then there is literally nothing that the federal government can't force us to
do,’ he said. ‘Nothing.’”).
9 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health
Insurance, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482, 483 (2010) (“Although opponents will challenge the
individual mandate in court, constitutional challenges are unlikely to succeed.”); Judith
Solomon, Efforts to Nullify Health Reform Likely to Fail, But Could Interfere with Law’s
Implementation, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 3 (Apr. 7, 2010),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-7-10health2.pdf (“[A]s Yale law professor Jack M. Balkin has
pointed out, people who do not buy coverage do engage in economic activity. When uninsured
people get sick they go to emergency rooms, borrow money from family members, buy overthe-counter drugs, or engage in other economic activities as a substitute for paying premiums.”
(footnote omitted)); Richard Cordray & Tom Miller, Why We Won’t File States’ Rights Suits,
POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35335.html
(noting that if the commerce power authorizes Congress to prohibit the home cultivation of
marijuana, “then surely it authorizes Congress to regulate health care”).
10 This Note uses the term “unprecedented argument” as shorthand for the argument that
the novelty or lack of historical precedent for some governmental action means that the Court
should presume that the action is unconstitutional or, stated simply, the lack-of-precedentequals-lack-of-power argument.
11 Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 33, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health
& Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT), 2010 WL
3500155.
12 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1289 (11th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–393), and 80 U.S.L.W. 3199
(U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–398), and cert. granted in part, 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14,
2011) (No. 11–400); see also Thomas Moore Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 558 (6th Cir.
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (suggesting the individual mandate’s novelty is the “most
compelling” of the “arguments auditioning to invalidate” it). In the end, Judge Sutton found that
the petitioner’s facial challenge must fail because the individual mandate was constitutional in
certain applications. See id. at 565–66 (arguing that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the
individual mandate is unconstitutional “in all of its applications”). But Judge Sutton recognized,
citing Printz, the strength of the unprecedented argument. Id. at 559. But see Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations and footnotes omitted):
The Supreme Court occasionally has treated a particular legislative device’s lack of
historical pedigree as evidence that the device may exceed Congress's constitutional
bounds. But . . . novelty cuts another way. We are obliged—and this might well be
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States District Judge Roger Vinson, presiding at the trial of the case
that the Eleventh Circuit later reviewed, found that while the
individual mandate’s novelty did “not automatically render it
unconstitutional, there is perhaps a presumption that it is.” 13 This
historic legal dispute is now before the Supreme Court, 14 which will
ultimately decide the significance of the individual mandate’s
novelty.

our most important consideration—to presume that acts of Congress are
constitutional.
Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit recognized the most powerful argument against the
unprecedented argument, discussed infra in Parts III and IV—congressional actions should be
presumed constitutional, despite any novelty.
13 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 n.21
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (ruling on the government’s motion to dismiss). Judge Vinson cited Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–908 (1997) for that proposition. See id. at 1164 (citing Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. at 907–08)); see also infra notes 273–74 and accompanying text
(discussing this proposition). At the motion to dismiss stage, the individual mandate’s lack of
historical precedent was alone enough for the plaintiff states’ success. See Florida, 716 F. Supp.
2d at 1164 (“[A]t this stage of the case, the plaintiffs have most definitely stated a plausible
claim . . . .”) Subsequently, Judge Vinson concluded that the individual mandate is
unconstitutional relying, in part, on the lack of historical precedent argument. See Florida v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1284–85 (N.D. Fla. 2011)
(quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 905, 908) (noting that “an ‘absence of [such] power’ might
reasonably be inferred where—as here—‘earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive
power’”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 80 U.S.L.W.
3198 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–393), and cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14,
2011) (No. 11–398), and cert. granted in part, 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–
400). Ultimately, based on an interpretation of the Commerce Clause’s original meaning and the
Supreme Court’s “contracted and expanded” Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Judge Vinson
held that “because activity is required under the Commerce Clause, the individual mandate
exceed[ed] Congress’ commerce power.” Id. at 1285, 1295. Commentators have since disagreed
about the wisdom of Judge Vinson’s lengthy opinion. Compare Randy E. Barnett & Elizabeth
Price Foley, Op-Ed, The Nuts and Bolts of the ObamaCare Ruling, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2011, at
A17 (“Judge Vinson's decisive rejection of all these theories is another significant victory for
individual liberty—the ultimate purpose of federalism—and it lays the intellectual groundwork
for every decision on the mandate yet to come.”), with Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., On Health
Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at A27 (“There is every reason to believe
that a strong, nonpartisan majority of justices will do their constitutional duty . . . and treat this
constitutional challenge for what it is—a political objection in legal garb.”), and Orin Kerr, A
Comment on District Court Originalism, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (February 1, 2011, 5:35
PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/01/a-comment-on-district-court-originalism (discussing Judge
Vinson’s use of the Commerce Clause’s original meaning and noting that “[g]iven the gap
between the original meaning of the scope of federal power and the case precedents, I don’t
think this approach is persuasive for a District Court judge to take”).
14 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14,
2011) (No. 11–400) (granting petition for certiorari, limited to the question of whether Congress
has the power to enact the individual mandate). The Court granted various petitions on various
questions and ultimately set five and a half hours of argument for four separate issues. See Lyle
Denniston, Court Sets 5 1/2-Hour Hearing on Health Care, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2011,
11:09 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/court-sets-5-12-hour-hearing-on-health-care
(reviewing and explaining the Court’s various orders).
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Framed precisely by the health care debate, the issue that this Note
addresses is whether the lack of historical precedent for a
governmental action means that the Court should presume that the
action is unconstitutional. In concrete terms, “[t]he proliferation of
Government, State and Federal, would amaze the Framers . . . .” 15
During this “breathtaking expansion” 16 of Congress’s power, there
has been a first time for countless powers, and ever-evolving
technology will undoubtedly continue the trend. A presumption that
an unprecedented governmental action is invalid because of its
novelty thus appears ill advised. The Supreme Court has, however,
long held that history—of both the Constitution’s original meaning
and constitutional actors’ practices since the framing—is important. 17
After all, as Judge Posner posits, no legal professional let alone judge
would simply assert that “[t]his is what the law ought to be today,
regardless of what it was yesterday, because we have new problems
and need new solutions.” 18
There is, however, often sharp disagreement about what facts the
history books reveal and those facts’ applicability to contemporary
issues. 19 The most notorious problem is “law-office” history, a
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“Due to the emergence of an integrated and industrialized national economy, this
Court has been required to examine and review a breathtaking expansion of the powers of
Congress.”).
17 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (noting “that a
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . acquiesced in for a long term of
years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions” and citing cases in support of this
proposition); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (noting that “historical
evidence sheds light . . . on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean [and]
also on how they thought that” it should be applied); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22,
31 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (“If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it . . . .”).
18 Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 580 (2000) (internal quotation and
footnote omitted). Even the landmark privacy case Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), in which Justice Douglas held “that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance,” invoked historic overtones to support the far-reaching proposition. Id. at 484
(emphasis added). At the close of the opinion, Justice Douglas noted, “[w]e deal with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school
system.” Id. at 486.
19 See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 275 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“It is a familiar adage that history is written by the victors . . . .”); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 106–07 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This Court's opinions
frequently make assertions of historical fact, but those assertions are not authoritative as to
history in the same way that our interpretations of laws are authoritative as to them.”). Dueling
opinions frequently invoke (or ignore) history in general to support each opinion’s respective
position. That observation, however, is not limited to Justices’ use of historical precedent. For
instance, in Parents Involved in Community Schools. v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007), both Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality and Justice Breyer’s dissent claim to be the
15
16
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practice that historian Alfred H. Kelly first described in 1965 as the
selection of historical facts to support a predetermined outcome
without regard for context or contradiction. 20 The potential for the
distortion of the past is compounded when meaning is inferred from
historical silence. 21 If the legislature enacts novel legislation designed
to manage today’s problems, the Court may, despite that novelty,
“indulge some latitude of interpretation for changing times.” 22 Or,
conversely, the Court could confine the legislature to history’s
strictures—placing a heavy burden on it—when there is no historical
precedent for the action.
The former position is more defensible for at least four reasons.
First, society evolves and changes over time, making history itself a
dynamic construct; stated simply, “tradition is a living thing.”23
Second, the meaning of the past is often ambiguous, which weakens
history’s authoritativeness over contemporary issues. 24 Third,
concluding that historical silence—which is itself often
questionable—elicits a negative presumption inescapably involves
political or policy judgments that frustrate the People’s will. 25 And
lastly, though most importantly, congressional actions—except in rare
occurrences—are presumed to be constitutional. 26 The first two of
these reasons are based on the position that when history garners
authority over contemporary issues, it should be accurate. The last
two are grounded in the philosophy of judicial restraint and deference
to the country’s public officials who are elected by and for the People,
the ultimate source of our nation’s sovereignty.

true supporters of the Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). The Chief Justice opines, “[t]his fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to
Brown itself.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 143. Meanwhile, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Breyer admonishes, “[t]o invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of Brown.”
Id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20 See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP CT. REV. 119,
122 n.13 ( defining “law-office” history as “the selection of data favorable to the position being
advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the
relevance of the data proffered”).
21 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the problems with inferring meaning from
silence.
22 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
23 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the Court’s questionable use of history in Printz).
25 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the problems with inferring meaning from
silence.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”).
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The argument advanced here is narrow. It does not call on the
Court to ignore history. To the contrary, historical facts are often
useful and illustrative of a law’s purpose and effect. This Note’s focus
is confined to the unprecedented or, more specifically, the lack-ofprecedent-equals-lack-of-power argument. Further, as Part IV
discusses, the lack of historical precedent in certain situations can be
a factor, albeit a minor one, in the Court’s conclusion that the
legislature lacks the power for a given action. Most importantly, and
perhaps most disconcertingly, a general presumption of invalidity
empowers the Court to invade the province of Congress more
frequently and fluently, an invasion that is inevitably in tension with a
free, democratic society. 27 Taken to the extreme, it is judicial activism
running riot. 28
But at the end the twentieth Century, more than 200 years after the
ink on the Constitution dried, the unprecedented argument assumed
unprecedented weight in the Court’s decisions. 29 This argument was
27 Cf. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.) (“To
fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and before
legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to
vindicate the self-confidence of a free people.”), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
28 Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring) (concurring that the National Industrial Recovery Act was
unconstitutional under the non-delegation doctrine and noting that the code’s grant of power
was “delegation running riot”). Commentators have argued, and shown through empirical study,
that on questions of first impression ideology is the guiding light. See Stefanie A. Lindquist &
Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of
Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1184 (2005) (noting that “ideology plays a substantial role
in determining the path of the law via cases of first impression”).
To some, however, to not sharply review legislative enactments is an “abdication of . . .
duty.” Ohio Grocers Ass’n v. Levin, 916 N.E.2d 446, 460 (Ohio 2009) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting);
see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 10 (1959) (“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). But see Felix Frankfurter,
John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219 (1955) (noting that
Marshall’s decision “is not minimized by suggesting that its reasoning is not impeccable and its
conclusion, however wise, not inevitable.”); infra notes 106–21 and accompanying text
(discussing judicial restraint). Though Levin is an Ohio Supreme Court case, Justice Pfeifer’s
dissent argued generally against a presumption of validity for any legislative enactments. See
Levin, 916 N.E.2d at 461 (noting that “[t]he bottom line is that courts are the ultimate arbiters of
what is constitutional, and have been since 1803, and we ought not to be saddled with a
presumption that restricts our ability to declare a suspect statute unconstitutional.” (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Ultimately, the strength of a challenger’s objection to a statute’s constitutionality
necessary for any particular judge to vote to strike down the statute is dependent, at least in part,
on how convinced that judge is about the propriety of judicial review, a power not expressly
granted to the judiciary. This Note’s position supports—but is not dependent on—a restrained
approach.
29 See infra Part II (discussing recent cases that rely on the unprecedented argument to
support a finding that a congressional action is unconstitutional).
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most pronounced in the Court’s anti-commandeering decision Printz
v. United States. 30 Justice Scalia, writing for the slim majority,
painstakingly described the novelty of the federal government’s “use
of [the] highly attractive power” of commandeering state and local
executive apparatuses. 31 That novelty, Justice Scalia held, “tend[ed]
to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted [in Printz]
. . . .” 32 Around the same time as Printz, the Court strengthened the
state sovereign immunity defense in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida 33 and Alden v. Maine. 34 Both the Alden and Seminole Tribe
opinions relied on the unprecedented argument to support the
conclusion that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity
using its Commerce Clause powers. 35 All three of these cases were
hotly contested 5-4 decisions with sharp disagreement regarding the
appropriate reading of history. 36 Use of the unprecedented argument
to thwart congressional action was most recently seen in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,37
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 905.
32 Id. at 918.
33 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
34 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
35 Id. at 743–44 (finding that the Court’s holding was “supported by early congressional
practice” in which the Court “discovered no instance in which [early Congresses] purported to
authorize suits against nonconsenting states in these fora”); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71
(pointing out that “the Nation survived for nearly two centuries without the question of the
existence of such power ever being presented to this Court”). Congress may, however, abrogate
state sovereign immunity under certain other clauses of the Constitution. See Cent. Va. Cmty.
Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (holding that the Congress’s “power to [exercise a
preference action] arises from the Bankruptcy Clause itself; the relevant ‘abrogation’ is the one
effected in the plan of the Convention, not by statute.”); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)) (“Congress
may, however, abrogate States’ sovereign immunity through a valid exercise of its § 5 power,
for ‘the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”)..
Whether and how Katz and Seminole Tribe can be reconciled is a question for another
discussion. Cf. Katz, 546 U.S. at 393 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It would be one thing if the
majority simply wanted to overrule Seminole Tribe altogether. That would be wrong, but at least
the terms of our disagreement would be transparent.”).
36 The conservatives on the Court were in the majority in these cases. The language in the
Printz opinion is the most draconian. For an argument that Justice Scalia’s decision in Printz
breaks from his “nationalist leanings” because the “federal government has grown too large and
its mandates have become too severe for even an ardent Federalist like himself,” see James B.
Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia’s ‘Split Personality,’ 16 J. L. & POL. 231, 234,
237 (2000). For a criticism of Justice Scalia’s use of history in Printz, see Gene R. Nichol,
Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 953, 963–968 (1999).
37 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010). More recently, in April of 2011, the Court acknowledged
the unprecedented argument, but rejected it. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart,
131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641–42 (2011) (holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine’s exception to state
sovereign immunity permitted an independent state agency to sue a state official to require the
state official to follow federal law). In Stewart, Justice Scalia, the author of Printz and arguably
30
31
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where a questionable interpretation of the reasoning behind a 1789
congressional vote factored heavily in the Court’s analysis. 38 All
these decisions not only involved law-office history of the highest
order, but also centered around what was not said or had not been
done.
Part I of this Note addresses the use of history in constitutional
adjudication generally and elaborates on the problem of law-office
history. Part II reviews the Court’s use of the unprecedented argument
to justify its conclusions in Free Enterprise Fund, Seminole Tribe,
Printz, and Alden. Part III argues that, although the language of those
cases may support a presumption of invalidity, that presumption is
unjustified. Part IV proposes two principles—candor and
consistency—that should guide the Court’s review of novel actions.
Those principles must be applied with a strong sense of judicial
restraint. Finally, Part IV concludes that lawyers and judges
evaluating the individual mandate should shift their attention away
from the unprecedented question. Whether the government’s past
actions can be sufficiently analogized to the individual mandate or
some historical statements can be found suggesting that Congress
could force citizens to purchase a commodity, thereby making the
individual mandate “precedented,” should not determine the law’s
fate. Debating history should be left to historians. 39
I. HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
Long ago Justice Holmes admonished that “a page of history is
worth a volume of logic.” 40 Perhaps that aphorism explains the
Court’s reverence for history in constitutional adjudication.

the originator of the unprecedented argument, found it “a weight[y] objection” but insufficient
to carry the day. Id. at 1641. Justice Scalia reasoned that though novelty “is often the
consequence of past constitutional doubts . . .”—an assertion this Note’s purpose is to
disprove—the situation in Stewart was extremely peculiar and likely had never arisen because
the conditions necessary for it to arise were likely never present. Id. at 1642. Thus, the
unprecedented argument carried little weight. Id. This Note argues that the Court should come
to the same conclusion that it did in Stewart much more often.
38 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3152 (discussing the debate in Congress at the time
of the creation of the first executive departments regarding which branch had the authority to
remove executive officers).
39 Even originalists sometimes concede that the “task [is] sometimes better suited [for] the
historian than the lawyer.” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 856–57 (1989) (“Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous mass of
material . . . . Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material . . . .
And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the
time . . . . It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.”).
40 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
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Nevertheless, while all judges agree that lessons from the past can be
a useful tool, the weight attributed to history is rather controversial. 41
The Court has used history since its inception. Chief Justice John
Marshall’s conclusion in McCulloch v. Maryland 42 was that Congress
had the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to incorporate a
bank. 43 In reaching this decision, Marshall observed that “[t]he
principle now contested was introduced at a very early period [in] our
history [and] has been recognised . . . as a law of undoubted
obligation.” 44 But Marshall did not employ the country’s
“acquiescence” with the act to automatically validate the law. 45
“These observations belong to the cause,” said Marshall, “but they are
not made under the impression that, were the question entirely new,
the law would be found irreconcilable with the [C]onstitution.” 46
As a preliminary matter, the question when the Court interprets the
Constitution is always whether a congressional or executive action is
“incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the
Union.” 47 When the Court interprets a statute, the text is always the
41 A classic example of this tension, discussed by Kelly in Clio and the Court, supra note
20, is Justice Frankfurter’s concurring and Justice Black’s dissenting opinions in Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 68 (1947). A recent example is an exchange between Justices Scalia
and Alito in a Supreme Court oral argument that went as follows:

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I think what Justice Scalia wants to know is what James
Madison thought about video games. (Laughter) Did he enjoy them?
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I want to know what James Madison thought about
violence. Was there any indication that anybody thought, when the First Amendment
was adopted, that there—there was an exception to it for—for speech regarding
violence? Anybody?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 130 S. Ct.
2398 (2010) (No. 08–1448).
42 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
43 Id. at 424.
44 Id. at 401.
45 Marshall used history frequently and is commonly viewed as the technique’s originator.
See Kelly, supra note 20, at 123 (noting that John Marshall “introduced [the] technique very
successfully, and the Court has used it ever since”). His method is now employed by justices
from all camps of constitutional interpretation. See Posner, supra note 18, at 582–583
(discussing various views on the use of history in constitutional adjudication). Modern justices’
assertions are, at best, less accurate than the “walking historical ‘primary source’” that Marshall
was. Kelly, supra note 20, at 123–24. Kelly calls Marshall’s practice history by “judicial fiat” or
“authoritative revelation.” Id. at 122. Kelly argues that creation of history by “judicial fiat”
occurs when the Court simply states the framers’ intentions, without an extended essay into
other primary sources. Id. at 122–23. This practice then allows later Courts to cite the decision
rather than the primary source. Id. at 123 (noting that “by quoting history, the Court made
history, since what it declared history be was frequently more important than what the history
might actually have been). Since today’s Justices are not “walking primary sources,” they
typically include an extended essay discussing primary sources. The essay, however, is typically
of the “law-office” variety.–
46 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 402.
47 Id. at 425.
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beginning of the inquiry and if unambiguous, usually the end as
well. 48 When constitutional texts are interpreted, however, their short
phrases are almost always colored by the more than 200 years of
history and doctrine. 49 That is so because the nature of a constitution
“requires[] that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.” 50
“[T]o contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit,” said Chief Justice Marshall, “would partake
of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind.” 51 Marshall concluded that famous discussion: “[W]e
must never forget[] that it is a constitution we are expounding.” 52
As Marshall foreshadowed, the short Constitution, compounded
with the framers’ novel experiment of federalism, creates endless
questions about its meaning. Because the amendment process is
difficult and the provisions are, at best, not self-defining, courts must
expound the Constitution’s text using other interpretive tools. 53
One of those interpretive tools is history. 54 The Court’s frequent
use of history without offering much justification tends to implicitly
48 See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the
statute means.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (discussing the interpretive philosophy of textualism).
But if unambiguous texts produce “absurd” results, even the most ardent textualist will deviate
from the unambiguous text to consult other sources such as legislative history. See Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I
think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including the background of Rule
609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us an
unthinkable disposition . . . .”); see also Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”).
49 See SCALIA, supra note 48, at 39 (noting that in Constitutional law case briefs “you will
rarely find the discussion addressed to the text of the constitutional provision that is at issue”).
50 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no
constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs' challenge must be
sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the
jurisprudence of this Court.”).
54 For example, in the Court’s infancy, Justice Paterson opined, “To this objection, which
is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a period
of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.” Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309
(1803) (holding that Congress had the power and authority to establish and abolish lower federal
courts). The objection in Stuart was that Supreme Court Justices, who at that time “rode circuit”
to hear cases at the lower federal courts, had no right to do so because they were not appointed
as such. Id. During the 2010 term, the Court, while noting longstanding practice is not
conclusive, held that “[a] history of involvement . . . can nonetheless be ‘helpful in reviewing
the substance of a congressional statutory scheme,’ and, in particular, the reasonableness of the
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legitimize the practice. 55 Discussion is nonetheless useful to clarify
both the reasons behind and justifications for the use of history in
constitutional law.
In judicial opinions, historical analysis manifests itself in roughly
two forms: (1) original meaning (or intent) and (2) the historical
practices of constitutional actors. This Part’s first section briefly
touches on the use of original meaning in constitutional interpretation
and its applicability to the presumption of invalidity. The next section
discusses the Court’s reliance on the historical practices of
constitutional actors. The final section canvases the major problem of
history in law: 56 law-office history. 57
A. Constitutional Interpretation, Originalism, and Silent History
One use of history—in the quest to find meaning in ambiguity—is
to inform present-day interpreters what the constitutional phrases
meant when they were written. 58 That is the heart of the theory
advocated in the 1950s and 60s by Justice Hugo Black and today by

relation between the new statute and pre-existing federal interests.” United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1958 (2010) (citations omitted). Legislative history is also often used in
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508–09
(1989) (“Concluding that the text is ambiguous . . . we then seek guidance from legislative
history and from the Rules’ overall structure.”). But the history this Note grapples with is not
only what the framers said or debated about the text to ascertain its purpose, but also that of
historical practice by the legislature and executive.
55 See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 183 (1993)
(“Tradition has become one of the few sources of authority in constitutional interpretation that
ostensibly need no justification.” (footnote omitted)).
56 The problem of law-office history is amplified when the history books are silent. See
infra Part III.C.
57 See infra Part I.C (discussing law-office history).
58 See SCALIA, supra note 48, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely . . .
the original meaning of the text . . . .”). It is important to note that “the original meaning of the
text” is different than “what the original draftsmen intended.” Id. Using the framers’ intent is
inappropriate for constitutional interpretation for a number of reasons. See H. Jefferson Powell,
Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 664 (1987). Powell argues that not only does using
intent fail to address the issue of “group intent” (i.e., the many minds that were involved in the
framing and ratifying), but also that “it asserts rather than proves a highly controversial position
in the theory of interpretation, namely that ‘meaning’ is equivalent to ‘intent.’ The list of those
who have rejected [that] position, at least with respect to the Constitution, includes such
worthies as James Madison, John Marshall, and Oliver Wendell Holmes.” Id. at 663–64
(footnote omitted). For purposes of this Note, meaning and intent collapse into a single issue:
the consultation of primary sources that are over two hundred years old to answer a
contemporary question. Also, it is noteworthy that while the scholarship draws a sharp
distinction between meaning and intent, see, e.g., id. at 664 (rejecting the position that meaning
is equivalent to intent), judicial analysis of original meaning often includes a discussion of the
framers’ intent (most notably James Madison and Alexander Hamilton), as expressed in writings
contemporaneous with the framing such as the Federalist Papers. See, e.g., Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–16 (1997) (analyzing discussions contemporaneous with the framers,
including several originally published in the Federalist Papers).

4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM

534

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

Justices Scalia and Thomas: originalism. 59 Binding judges to the
text’s original meaning can serve to “prevent the words . . . from
becoming completely empty containers for whatever meaning with
which we care to fill them.” 60 History is central to the originalists’
understanding of the Constitution. Justice Scalia’s intellectual
presence and candor about his constitutional theory increased the
Court’s reliance on history, especially in opinions that he wrote, very
early in his tenure. 61
Originalists believe that “the semantic meaning of the written
Constitution was fixed at the time of its enactment . . . .” 62 Lawrence
B. Solum denotes that belief—which all originalist theories share—
the “fixation thesis.” 63 Though the specifics of originalist theories
vary, 64 the fixation thesis necessitates a historical inquiry. 65
Critics of originalism argue that the amateurish use of history by
originalist judges breeds activism and is plagued by the problem of
law-office history. 66 The “fixation thesis” of originalism is the most
59 See generally SCALIA, supra note 48, at 39 (discussing the original meaning theory of
constitutional interpretation).
60 Powell, supra note 58, at 696 (noting also that “James Madison . . . thought that
contemporaneous expositions of the Constitution were of some value in checking unintended
change resulting from the fluidity of language”). In that way, originalism is consistent with the
Madisonian view of constitutional interpretation. James Madison, however, likely did not agree
with the strict fixation thesis of originalism, given his changed view on the constitutionality of a
national bank. See infra note 75 (discussing Madison’s signing of the bill that chartered the
Second National Bank despite the fact that as a Congressman he believed a federally chartered
bank was unconstitutional).
61 See Brown, supra note 55, at 179–80 (written in 1993 and noting that “Scalia has
personally authored at least fifty-three opinions that relied expressly on tradition to resolve
constitutional issues”).
62 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66
(2011).
63 See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Papers Series No. 07–24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244
(“Almost all originalists agree, explicitly or implicitly, that the meaning (or ‘semantic content’)
of a given Constitutional provision was fixed at the time the provision was framed and
ratified.”).
64 See id. at 18–19 (discussing new originalism, which is generally defined as an inquiry
in the original public meaning of the Constitution rather than intent of the framers). Compare
Barnett, supra note 62, at 71 (arguing that while questions of ambiguity can typically be
answered by the semantic meaning of the text, questions of vagueness cannot) with John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 774 (2009)
(disagreeing with Barnett’s distinction and asserting that “[u]nder the original interpretive rules,
we believe that interpreters were required to select the interpretation of ambiguous and vague
terms that had the stronger evidence in its favor”).
65 See Powell, supra note 58, at 660–61 (discussing the turn to history associated with
originalism).
66 See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 76 (2010)
(discussing why the historical approach adopted by originalists “suffers serious problems”);
Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law-Office History: ‘Meet the New Boss, Same as
the Old Boss’, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1124–25 (2009) (“Without a mastery of the elementary
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intensely critiqued. 67 One argument against the thesis is that it seems
contrary to Chief Justice Marshall’s warning that “we must never
forget[] that it is a constitution we are expounding.” 68 McCulloch is
often cited for the proposition that Congress’s enumerated powers
should be given a broad construction. 69 Accompanied by the notion
that the Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come,” 70 the
“‘open-ended’ clauses of the Constitution” are in tension with the
notion that the text represents an original and identifiable meaning. 71
Another objection to originalism is that the theory relies on the
questionable assumption that there is one objective reading of
history. 72 If an originalist concedes that the interpretation of history is
partially subjective, the theory—when presented as one of
restraint 73—breaks down. In A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia

techniques of historical research, and without some grounding in the relevant historiography of
early American history, the new originalism will continue to be little more than a rebranded
version of the old law office history.”); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History ‘Lite’ in Modern
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995) (noting that history in law “at
times fall[s] below even the standards of undergraduate history writing”). For a piece which is
less a critique of originalism and more a parody on constitutional interpretation—or the
development of new theories at least—itself, see generally Anonymous, Our Boggling
Constitution; or, Taking Text Really, Really Seriously, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 651 (2010).
67 Perhaps the most pithy rejection of originalism was written by Justice Jackson,
concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952):
“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called
upon to interpret for Pharaoh.” Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
68 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
69 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the ‘Great’ Marshall Court Decisions?,
87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1126 (2001) (noting that “[a]fter McCulloch, it was difficult to imagine a
politically plausible congressional exercise of power that would exceed constitutional
limitations”).
70 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
71 See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1085, 1092 (1989) (noting that one “argument against originalism . . . is that the Framers
anticipated that the courts would defend human rights beyond those expressly listed in the Bill
of Rights”).
72 Cf. Farber, supra note 71, at 1095 (“The difficulties of this historical inquiry are
obvious, since the framers are unlikely to have discussed the precise balance between general
principles and specific examples.”); Geoffrey Schotter, Note, Diachronic Constitutionalism: A
Remedy for the Court’s Originalist Fixation, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1241, 1277 (2010)
(noting that the “liberties” Justice Scalia took in District of Columbia v. Heller interpreting the
Second Amendment’s history “illustrate dramatically the subjectivity and discretion inherent in
the originalist search for synchronic meaning”); see also PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM
415 (1988) (discussing objectivity in the history profession).
73 The originalist movement gained popularity in the 1980s as an attempt to cabin what
proponents such as Raoul Berger and Robert Bork saw as judicial activism to the nth degree.
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990) (“In truth, only the approach of
original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must
meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.”); Raoul Berger, ‘Original Intention’ in
Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296, 297 (1986) (noting Berger’s concern “with
judicial revision of the Fourteenth Amendment”). More recent commentators, however, argue
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criticized theories that are not faithful to the Constitution’s original
meaning:
[I]t is known and understood that if th[e] logic [of existing
case law] fails to produce what in the view of the current
Supreme Court is the desirable result for the case at hand,
then, like good common-law judges, the Court will
distinguish its precedents, or narrow them, or if all else fails
overrule them, in order that the Constitution might mean what
it ought to mean. 74
Scalia’s argument relies on a thin distinction between
distinguishing case law (i.e., common law method) and distinguishing
among competing historical facts (i.e., originalism). Often “[a]
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields
no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from
respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel
each other.” 75 If an originalist judge chooses sides in a historical
partisan debate—and in doing so strikes down an act of Congress—he
or she is just as guilty as any other activist judge, for example, one
who prefers to reference the Constitution’s penumbras and
emanations to decide the controversy at bar.
Though history is and should be important, when originalist judges
elevate ambiguous history 76 to a level of authority second only to the
Constitution’s short phrases, the problem of law-office history shines
with unparalleled light. 77 The scholarship in this area is as vast as the

that originalism “does not require judges to get out of the way of legislatures. It requires judges
to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.” Keith E. Whittington,
The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004).
74 SCALIA, supra note 48, at 39.
75 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
76 See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Address to the Federal Bar Association, 19 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 15, 19–20 (1985) (discussing, in response to Attorney General Meese’s comments on
originalism, the problem of ambiguities in the historical record such as the fact that James
Madison the Congressman believed a federally chartered bank was unconstitutional but James
Madison the President signed the bill that charted the Second National Bank).
77 As H. Jefferson Powell noted:
If the founders, as you understand them, always agree with you, it is logically
possible that you are in incredible harmony with them. It is considerably more likely
that your reconstruction of their views is being systematically warped by your
personal opinions on constitutional construction. . . . Justices Hugo Black and
William Rehnquist . . . have been equally consistent in their claims that the founders’
views coincided with their own, despite historical evidence to the contrary.
Powell, supra note 58, at 677.
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arguments are intricate. 78 This Note does not need to resolve
arguments about the writtenness of and fidelity to the Constitution. It
suffices to say that the originalist method is predisposed to be
attracted to the presumption of invalidity.
Other methods of constitutional interpretation are less amenable to
the presumption of invalidity. One such theory, espoused by Justice
Robert H. Jackson, is pragmatism. 79 Though a definition of
pragmatism is somewhat elusive, a pragmatic judge, mindful of
judicial restraint, attempts to arrive at the best result both in the
present case and the future. 80 The pragmatic judge may use history as
one interpretive tool but is certainly not bound by it. 81 Pragmatism, as
advanced by Justice Jackson, is a direct rejection of originalist
principles. 82
Another theory less amenable to the presumption of invalidity is
the concept of “active liberty,” advanced by Justice Breyer in his
recent books concerning constitutional interpretation. 83 Justice Breyer
defines the concept of active liberty as “a sharing of a nation’s
sovereign authority among its people.” 84 The philosophy that Justice
Breyer advocates seeks to be consistent with the “people’s will,”
which includes longstanding historical precedent. 85 Indeed, “a deepseated conviction on the part of the people . . . is entitled to great
78 See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (noting
that since Farber’s article “the literature [on originalism] has grown many times larger, fueled
both by the emergence of powerful new scholarly defenders of originalism and by the fact that
the current composition of the Supreme Court, most notably Justices Scalia and Thomas, gives
originalist arguments a ready and important audience”).
79 See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1996)
(discussing the vagueness of the theory and the Justices who have been called pragmatists).
80 See id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (adopting, as a definition of
a pragmatist judge, “[a] judge [who] always tries to do the best he can do for the present and the
future . . . ”).
81 Judge Posner described a pragmatic approach to history:

The study of other laws, or of world public opinion as crystallized in foreign law and
practices, is a more profitable inquiry than trying to find some bit of eighteenthcentury evidence that maybe the framers of the Constitution wanted courts to make
sure punishments prescribed by statute were proportional to the gravity, or difficulty
of apprehension, or profitability, or some other relevant characteristic of the crime. If
I found such evidence I would think it a valuable bone to toss to a positivist or
formalist colleague but I would not be embarrassed by its absence because I would
not think myself duty-bound to maintain consistency with past decisions.
Id. at 13–14.
82 See supra note 67 for Justice Jackson’s rejection of originalism.
83 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 32 (2008); BREYER, supra note 66, at 80.
According to Judge Posner, Breyer is also sometimes labeled a pragmatist. See Posner, supra
note 79, at 2 (adding Breyer to the list of Supreme Court Justices who have been called
pragmatists).
84 BREYER, supra note 83, at 25–26.
85 Id. at 111.
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respect.” 86 A long-standing conviction, however, is not the end of the
matter, and Justice Breyer’s philosophy looks also at the present
consequences of the decision. 87
The methodology and merits of these three interpretive theories is
not at issue here. Rather, they illustrate that particular judges’
receptiveness to the presumption of invalidity varies with the
authoritativeness that the judge allots to history.
B. Historical Practices of Constitutional Actors
The type of history discussed above is the use of the Constitution’s
historic meaning to decide present controversies. A particular judge’s
opinion of the authoritativeness of the original meaning of the
Constitution determines, in part, his or her responsiveness to the
presumption of invalidity for novel actions. 88 The second type of
history often considered in judicial opinions is the historical practices
of constitutional actors. The justification used for past historical
practice is somewhat different from that of original meaning.
Historical practice tends to show constitutionality or
unconstitutionality based on the experiences of constitutional actors.
The relevance of this historical practice theory to this Note’s thesis
lies in the reasoning why historical practice is important: (1) the claim
and acquiescence, or reliance, theory; (2) judicial restraint, which
requires deference to coordinate branch’s actions; and (3) for general
lessons learned or rhetorical flair. Particularly, the theory of judicial
restraint contradicts the presumption of invalidity for novel actions.
This section discusses each justification in turn.
1. Claim and Acquiescence
The claim and acquiescence theory holds that longstanding
congressional (or executive) practice suggests that such practice is
consistent with the Constitution. 89 If an action has been acquiesced in
86 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (Holmes, J.), quoted in BREYER, supra note
83, at 108.
87 See BREYER, supra note 83, at 114 (noting that “consequences may decide a case in a
way that radically changes the law. But this is not always a bad thing.”).
88 Cf. Berman, supra note 78, at 21–22 (discussing the differences between strong and
weak originalism and that strong originalism contemplates “that original meaning either is the
only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or that it has at least lexical priority
over any other candidate meanings the text might bear”).
89 See, e.g., Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (discussing
“common consent”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (noting the established
principle that legislation laid down at the time of the framing and “acquiesced in for a long term
of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions” and citing cases in support of this
principle); cf. Holmes, supra note 1, at 476 (“Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to
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for a number of years, common consent tends to show that the action
is constitutional. “[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in
violation of the Constitution by long use,” but such use “is not
something to be lightly cast aside.” 90 In Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 91
a New York City property tax exemption for churches was challenged
under the Establishment Clause, 92 a jurisprudence that relies heavily
on history. 93 The Court found it significant that “Congress, from its
earliest days,” had viewed statutory real estate tax exemptions for
religious bodies as valid. 94 The nature of the Establishment Clause
justified the Court’s reliance on two centuries of uninterrupted
practice. The Court noted that the pre-Revolution practice has never
“given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or
religion . . . .” 95 The historical practice shed light on the precise
question presented: has government sponsored or favored any
religion?
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Steel Seizure Case, 96
discussed a position similar to the reliance theory in Walz. At issue
was President Truman’s power to seize the steel mills without
congressional authorization to avert a shutdown during the Korean
War. 97 Justice Frankfurter, concurring with the majority’s conclusion
that Truman did not possess seizure power, nonetheless noted that:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on
“executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II. 98

enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example.”).
90 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
91 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
92 Id. at 667.
93 See generally Garrett Coyle, Note, The Role of Tradition in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137 (2009) (discussing the use of history in the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
94 Walz, 397 U.S. at 677.
95 Id. at 678. The Chief Justice was responding to lone dissenter Justice Douglas’s
contention that the exemption is a “long step down the Establishment path.” Id. at 716 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text for Justice Douglas’s argument
dissenting in Walz.
96 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
97 Id. at 583 (majority opinion).
98 Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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If presidents from Washington through Truman had consistently
used the seizure power without congressional authorization, under
Frankfurter’s reasoning, the case would have come out differently. 99
By that logic, Congress’s inactivity could erode its powers.
Frankfurter’s reasoning appears to be similar to Justice Scalia’s
“unprecedented” argument in Printz. 100 But the reliance theory is
actually more defensible because it involves one branch of
government’s long acquiescence in another’s actions rather than a
general negative inference about the meaning of inaction. This theory
is considered more fully in Part IV infra.
2. Judicial Restraint
In 1788, Alexander Hamilton referred to the judiciary as the “least
dangerous” branch of the proposed government. 101 Later, James
Bradley Thayer, and after him Alexander M. Bickel, would marvel at
how the judicial “power to declare legislative Acts unconstitutional,
and to treat them as null, c[a]me about.” 102 This remarkable, and antimajoritarian, power was not explicitly granted by Article III. 103 The
story of how Chief Justice John Marshall, despite what today would
be a definite conflict of interest, established the power of judicial
review need not be elaborated here. At a minimum, Marshall’s
argument in Marbury v. Madison 104 was not his best work. 105
Marshall himself was willing to consider bargaining the doctrine
away “for security in the judicial office” during Justice Samuel
Chase’s impeachment. 106
99 There were in fact instances of past Presidents acting as if they possessed an inherent
seizure power, such as President Wilson’s seizure of Smith & Wesson during World War One.
Id. at 612 n.20. Frankfurter distinguished the past occurrences to find President Truman
overstepped his bounds. Id. at 613 (finding that these previous occurrences “do not add up,
either in number, scope, duration or contemporaneous legal justification” to other situations in
which presidents used this alleged power). A recent book about the Roosevelt Court, of which
Frankfurter was a part, noted that Frankfurter’s position—i.e., finding against Truman where
there he easily could have cited past precedent that would have been consistent with his test—
“reflected [his] contempt for Truman.” NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS 359 (2010).
100 See infra Part II.B (discussing the unprecedented argument as used in Supreme Court
cases dealing with issues of federalism).
101 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
102 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1893); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 1 (2d ed. 1986) (“The least dangerous branch of the American government is the most
extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known.”).
103 See BICKEL, supra note 102, at 1 (noting that judicial review “does not derive from any
explicit constitutional command”).
104 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
105 See BICKEL, supra note 102, at 3–10 (discussing the weaknesses of Marshall’s
reasoning in Marbury).
106 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 28 (Octagon Books
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The power to declare acts of the federal government
unconstitutional is likely not necessary for the union’s perpetuation,
acknowledged Justice Holmes: “I do not think that the United States
would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.” 107 The
Court should exercise this incredible power 108—not explicit in the
Constitution and not necessary for the continuance of the union—with
a due respect for the will of the People, a will personified in their
elected officials. 109
Perhaps the last great champion of judicial restraint was Justice
Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter promoted the principle originally to
counter the Lochner Court’s vested property rights conception of the
Due Process Clause and severely limited vision of Congress’s
commerce power, which was consistent with his political
philosophy. 110 The vested property rights doctrine frustrated
progressive reforms with which a majority of Americans agreed at the
state level while the tortured construction of the commerce power
frustrated similar reforms at the federal level. Frankfurter, however,
consistently applied his theory regardless of the legislative policy at
issue. 111

1979).
107 Id. at 16 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 295–6 (1920)).
108 Congress and the President do, however, have certain pressure points, exhibited most
dramatically in the Court Fight over the New Deal. See JACKSON, supra note 106 passim for a
discussion of the Court Fight.
109 The difficulty posed is that when the Court voids a congressional or executive action
the practice is “counter-majoritarian.” See BICKEL, supra note 102, at 16–17 (“[W]hen the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now . . . .”).
110 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29
HARV. L. REV. 353, 372 (1916) (discussing the Court’s decision in Lochner and noting that
“[f]undamental is the need that the profession realize the true nature of the issues involved in
these constitutional questions and the limited scope of the reviewing power of the courts.”).
111 Dissenting in the second flag salute case, which held that a school cannot expel students
for refusing to salute the American Flag, Frankfurter declared:

One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely
to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely
personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general
libertarian views in the Court’s opinion, representing as they do the thought and
action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic
nor agnostic. We owe equal attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by
our judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the
latest immigrants to these shores.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646–47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Barnette overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940),
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Judicial restraint requires deference to legislative and
administrative actions. 112 The principle, iterated by the Court in 1827,
is that “a decent respect [is] due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to
presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the constitution
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.” 113 In addition to the countermajoritarian difficulty, another reason that deference is appropriate is
the “oath of office” theory. 114 Under Article VI of the Constitution,
any public official whose duty involves a lawmaking or interpretive
function “shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support th[e]
Constitution.” 115 One commentator has noted that “the most obvious
way for a legislator to support the Constitution is to enact only
legislation that is constitutional.” 116

which upheld the right of a Pennsylvania school district to force its students to salute the flag
against the students’ religious objections. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (overruling Gobitis).
112 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”); Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (“The court must
defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is
any rational basis for such a finding.” (citations omitted)). For a discussion of the “decline of
deference in several doctrinal areas” see Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and
Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656,
660 (2000).
113 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827). The Court further stated that
“[t]his has always been the language of this Court, when that subject has called for its decision,
and I know that it expresses the honest sentiments of each and every member of this bench.” Id.;
see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that “the
only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint”).
114 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring):
In striking the balance the relevant considerations must be fairly, which means
coolly, weighed with due regard to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary
judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to
observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on
government.
see also Schapiro, supra note 112, at 665 (recognizing that all branches have an obligation
to interpret the Constitution).
115 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 3.
116 Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1975). Similarly, “[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961). Senator Orin Hatch
professed a contrary view in a statement made to the Judges of the Third Circuit, who were
testifying at Justice Samuel A. Alito’s confirmation hearings: “[Y]ou know, we pass
unconstitutional legislation up here all the time and if it hadn’t been for the courts, we would
probably not have preserved the Constitution. So I want to give you all credit for that.”
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 673 (2006) (statement of Sen. Orin Hatch). Senator Hatch’s statement, while professing
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More important than the oath of office consideration, the Court
should defer to legislatures because the political process, the
foundation of democracy, is entitled to respect. The power to govern
is and must be ultimately derived from the People. Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 117 held that it was this
“political process” that resolves federalism questions. 118 Garcia
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 119 which, less than a
decade before Garcia, created a reservoir of “traditional
governmental functions” that Congress could not regulate under the
Commerce Clause. 120 In Garcia, Justice Blackmun exhibited a
deferential tone and held that “we have no license to employ
freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.” 121 Deference
was due not merely because Congress takes an oath to uphold the
Constitution, but because “the principal means chosen by the Framers
to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself.” 122 The States are heavily
involved in the federal political process of making law. Every
legislator is accountable to his or her State’s electorate. Garcia
recognized that fact and deferred to the political judgments of
Congress, judgments the Court was not designed to make.
3. History as History
The most appropriate use of history is for the lessons that it
teaches future generations. This is likely what Justice Holmes had in
mind when he stated that “a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.” 123 In an article that catalogs the arrival of history in
constitutional scholarship, G. Edward White concluded: “The
significance of history for current constitutionalists can itself be seen

that he believes Congress passes unconstitutional legislations, does not necessarily imply that
his colleagues disregarded their oath to the Constitution. Indeed, congressmen—as well as
judges and ordinary citizens—may hold various views on the meaning of the fundamental
document, which is not only healthy but necessary in a diverse and evolving democracy such as
America.
117 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
118 Id. at 556.
119 426 U.S. 833 (1976) overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
120 Id. at 852.
121 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
122 Id.
123 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
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as confirming our increased awareness that the past remains an
inescapable dimension of our present.” 124
Other than as an instructive force, there is another role that history
prominently plays in the Court’s decisions: as a rhetorical device.
Every judge uses history; 125 “their professional training and
experience leads them to examine language, history, tradition,
precedent, purpose, and consequences.” 126 But the particular weight
given to each factor, including history, is a controversial topic. 127
Even a judge who is usually ready and willing to change course will
use history as a “useful mask for decisions reached on other
grounds.” 128 In an essay discussing the use of history in adjudication,
Judge Posner argues that one of the three principal ways courts use
history is rhetorically. 129 Indeed, “[m]uch of what passes for
constitutional law is a modern construct, but it is defended by
reference to ancient . . . texts.” 130
Defending a proposition that is truly novel by reference to our
enlightened forbearers is common in constitutional law. For example,
in Walz, though the practice at issue had been acquiesced in since
before the framing, Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter who would
have held that the Constitution prohibited the pre-Revolution practice,
relied extensively on history. 131 But if history conclusively pointed to
the other outcome, how did history help Douglas’s case? He had a
notable, revered supporter in the cause, indeed a Founding Father:
James Madison. 132 What does the relevance of one man’s view, even
the principal architect of the provision at issue, bear on the present
constitutionality of a long practiced action? One answer is that “our
ancestors had a freshness of insight or power of thought that is denied
to us moderns[.]” 133
124 G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV.
485, 633 (2002).
125 See supra Part I.A (discussing various ways in which judges use history).
126 BREYER, supra note 83, at 110.
127 Compare id. at 108 (describing the viewpoint that sees “texts as driven by purposes”),
with SCALIA, supra note 48, at 37 (applying history to the Constitution to understand the
original meaning of the text), and Posner, supra note 79, at 12 (arguing that a pragmatic judge is
not deterred “when confronted with outrageous conduct that the Constitution’s framers
neglected to foresee and make specific provision for”).
128 Posner, supra note 18, at 593.
129 Id.at 580.
130 Id.at 581.
131 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 704–06 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(discussing Madison’s opposition to a Virginia law that levied a tax to support Christian
Churches).
132 See id. at 704 (“The problem takes us back where Madison was in 1784 and 1785 when
he battled the Assessment Bill in Virginia.”).
133 Posner, supra note 18, at 582 (arguing that this viewpoint is a mistake).
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Given the fact that justices are not historians, expert or otherwise,
perhaps history as a rhetorical device should be the end point. There
is, however, a role for uncontroverted history as an instructive tool,
most persuasively when the history bears on the direct question
presented. Nevertheless, Justice Jackson gave a word of caution that
the Court sometimes neglects to heed: “Some clauses could be made
almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by refusal to indulge some
latitude of interpretation for changing times.” 134
C. Law-Office History
In 1965, Alfred H. Kelly charged that the Court was using the
history books to cherry-pick facts favorable to its position,
particularly when it broke with precedent. 135 Kelly termed this
practice “law-office” history. 136 “By invoking aboriginal meaning
through historical inquiry, the Court managed successfully to achieve
paradox: breaking precedence while rendering obeisance to the
doctrine of constitutional continuity.” 137 The two most controversial
nineteenth-century cases that the Court decided—Dred Scott v.
Sandford 138 and the Income Tax Cases 139—foreshadowed the current
practice. 140 Kelly described the historical essays of the Court in those
cases: “Each of the historical essays in question was partisan; each
used evidence wrenched from its contemporary historical context; and
each carefully selected those materials designed to prove the thesis at
hand, suppressing all data that might impeach the desired historical
conclusions.” 141
In the early twentieth century, the Lochner Court resorted
infrequently to law-office history. 142 But that Court was no stranger to

134 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
135 See Kelly, supra note 20, at 157–58 (noting that “the present use of history by the Court
is a Marxist-type perversion of the relation between truth and utility. It assumes that history can
be written to serve the interests of libertarian idealism”).
136 See id. at 122 n.13 (noting that law-office history is “the selection of data favorable to
the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or the proper
evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered”).
137 Id. at 126.
138 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
139 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
140 See Kelly, supra note 20, at 126 (noting that “Dred Scott and the Income Tax Cases . . .
anticipate[d] the historical technique that has taken on increasing significance in our time”).
141 Id.
142 See id. at 127 (“Resort to the historical essay as an activist device for breaking
precedent was not a prominent feature of the Court’s work in the opening decades of the
twentieth century.”)..
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the activist establishment of partisan rights. 143 The Lochner Court had
a much more effective tool than law-office history: substantive due
process and the infamous “freedom of contract” doctrine. 144 But after
the New Deal debacle—the Court packing plan—and Frankfurter’s
accession from law professor to justice, the Court was for a short time
dominated by a philosophy of restraint. 145 While Frankfurter’s
opinions often included a historical essay, not only were his essays
accurate, but they were also used to maintain constitutional continuity
rather than to break precedent. 146 Not long after Frankfurter’s
accession, the Court, under the lead of liberal Justices Black,
Douglas, and Rutledge, 147 reverted to law-office history to break with
precedent and establish partisan rights. 148
A good example of the Justice Black’s use of “law-office” history
is the reapportionment case Wesberry v. Sanders. 149 Wesberry held
that Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution required a rule of “one
man, one vote.” 150 Black began his historical discussion with the
question presented by Wesberry; however, the question is distinct
from the issue addressed by the framers:
The question of how the legislature should be constituted
precipitated the most bitter controversy of the Convention.
One principle was uppermost in the minds of many delegates:
that, no matter where he lived, each voter should have a voice
equal to that of every other in electing members of
Congress. 151
143 The Lochner court is infamous for “attempt[ing] to engraft its own nineteenth century
laissez-faire philosophy upon [the] Constitution . . . .” JACKSON, supra note 106, at 175.
144 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”).
145 Kelly, supra note 20, at 129.
146 See id. at 129–30 n.43 (citing Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the
Reading of Statutes, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30, 47 (Wallace Mendelson ed.,
1964)) (noting that “[o]ne particularly able commentator has remarked: ‘It would be a gross
understatement to say that Justice Frankfurter would have been a great historian. He has been
one.’”).
147 Black and Douglas, however, would later disagree about how liberal the language of the
Constitution would stretch. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas
wrote the majority opinion in Griswold, which recognized a Constitutional right to privacy. Id.
at 481–86. Justice Black dissented in Griswold, and argued that the text of the constitution does
not support the conclusion that the Court sought. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
148 See Kelly, supra note 20, at 130 (noting that the “reform-minded” Justices’ searched for
a theory of judicial review that could sustain their activism).
149 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
150 Id. at 7–8 (“We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2,
that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People of the several States’ means that as nearly as is
practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”).
151 Id. at 10.
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Black proceeded to quote numerous members of the Constitutional
Convention. For example, James Madison noted: “‘If the power is not
immediately derived from the people, in proportion to their numbers,
we may make a paper confederacy, but that will be all.’” 152 That
quote appears to contemplate a “one man, one vote rule,” as do many
others Black selectively cites. 153
Kelly was blunt with his criticism: “Mr. Justice Black, in order to
prove his point, mangled constitutional history.” 154 And it was for
good reason—the question Black needed answered, representation
within the states, was not the issue in the debate. The issue was
representation within the union. 155 Black broke H. Jefferson Powell’s
third rule for originalists: “History answers—and declines to
answer—its own issues, rather than the concerns of the interpreter.” 156
Kelly’s “law-office” history has not disappeared. 157 The more
steam that the originalism movement gains, the more rampant “lawoffice” history becomes. One issue is the divergent character and
philosophies of the professions of law and history. 158 Judges are
trained as lawyers, a profession that prizes zealous advocacy.
Classically trained historians, on the other hand, attempt to achieve a

152 Id. (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 472 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
153 See, e.g., id. at 10–11 (“[A]s James Wilson of Pennsylvania put it, equal numbers of
people ought to have an equal no. of representatives . . . and representatives of different districts
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to
each other.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154 Kelly, supra note 20, at 135.
155 See id. at 135 (“[T]he great debate in the Convention between the proponents of state
equality in the legislature and the advocates of what Madison called ‘proportional
representation’ as between the states . . . [had] nothing at all to do with the question of
representation within the states.”).
156 Powell, supra note 58, at 669 (emphasis removed).
157 See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 66, at 1106 (discussing District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), and noting that “Heller clearly demonstrates that this method [new
originalism] rests on a perverse reading of history that is totally inconsistent with Founding-era
practice”).
158 Mark Tushnet, who recognized that most lawyers who do history use the “law-office”
variety (“history-in-law” as Tushnet calls it), argued that “history-in-law” is different than
“history” and should be evaluated by different criteria, a claim he makes about interdisciplinary
scholarship in general. Mark Tushnet, Interdisiplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of Historyin-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 934–35 (1996). “Truly effective law-office history,” said
Tushnet, “acknowledges . . . contradictory data and explains them away.” Id. at 917–18. If
history in law was merely used as “decoration,” see id. at 913, (in other words, rhetorically)
perhaps Tushnet’s history in law would be harmless. Tushnet’s assessment, however, is
oversimplified, principally where the originalist method is concerned. If an originalist applies
history as gospel, he or she should be accurate. If, however, the originalist can easily explain
contradictory data away—for example, Justice Scalia labeling Alexander Hamilton “the most
expansive expositor of federal power,” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997)—
the philosophy breaks down to the “penumbras” and “emanations” of Griswold, which
originalism’s principal advocates of the 1980s attacked.
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level of objectivity about the past. 159 Though judges should remove
themselves from the position of advocate when evaluating history, as
Kelly’s observations illustrate, judges often fall far short of that
goal. 160 Federal judges are not selected solely based on their
achievements as restrained, objective interpreters; the nominations are
invariably politically motivated. 161
Law-office history is pertinent to this Note because a presumption
of invalidity for novel actions requires a historical inquiry that
consists of two questions: (1) whether the legislature or executive has
ever undertaken the action before; and (2) whether the Constitution’s
original meaning contemplates the action. If the Court presumes that
novel actions are invalid, the novelty of the action should be
uncontroverted, or at least well supported. In practice, the Court’s
historical discussion is often of the law-office variety. When faced
with competing versions of history the Court should, as it did most
famously in Brown v. Board of Education, 162 deem the evidence to be
inconclusive. 163
II. THE CASE LAW: THE UNPRECEDENTED ARGUMENT
This Part considers the use of history in three divisive areas of
constitutional law: (1) separation of powers, specifically the
President’s removal power; (2) the Court’s anti-commandeering
principle; and (3) state sovereign immunity. The last two topics are
merged into the broader heading of federalism. There are two main
themes that bind the three areas of constitutional law. There is no text
directly related to the Court’s holdings, and the unprecedented
159 See NOVICK, supra note 72, at 2 (“The objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or
disinterested, judge; it must never degenerate into that of advocate or, even worse,
propagandist.”). Though the “founding fathers of the historical profession” valued objectivity,
Novick describes the polarized period of the 1960s through the present as a crisis in objectivity.
Id. at 573. That the history profession itself questions objectivity strengthens the objections to
the elevation of “history”—whether the founders’ intentions, historical meaning, or past
congressional practice—to trump judicial precedent and reason, or worse, a decision of the
people’s representatives.
160 Novick actually compares the historian’s goal of objectivity to the “judicial qualities of
balance and evenhandedness.” Id. at 2. But, in practice, when history and the judiciary mix
those qualities seem to be abandoned and the opinions read like that of an advocate, not of an
objective historian.
161 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 143 (2005) (“Since the earliest days of the Republic, the vast majority
of federal jurists have been affiliated with a partisan group and, in fact, have shared the party
affiliation of the president who nominated them.”).
162 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 Id. at 489 (“This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these
sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At
best, they are inconclusive.”).
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argument is rampant in the Court’s decisions. How rampant, or more
precisely, whether the absence of historical precedent generates a
presumption of invalidity is the question with which this Part
grapples. This Part concludes that the Court’s language indeed
supports a presumption of invalidity. The following Part, Part III,
argues that, despite Part II’s conclusion, such a presumption is
unjustified and should be avoided. 164
A. The Decision of 1789: Binding in 2010
Justice Robert H. Jackson, concurring in the Steel Seizure Case,
stated that “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum
. . . .” 165 Justice Jackson’s discussion of implied authorization
presupposes the use of historical practice to construe the scope of
presidential power. 166 How history should be used, and, at least
regarding the President’s power to remove non-judicial executive
officers, what the history books actually tell us is subject to much
debate. 167
The landmark case, Myers v. United States, 168 was authored by
William Howard Taft, the only Chief Justice who was also
President. 169 The question required the Court to interpret Article II’s
164 Whether the Court merely invokes the unprecedented argument as “empty rhetoric” or a
mask for a decision reached on other grounds is another question. The inherent flaws of
affording such great weight to historical silence and the stark ideological divide in these cases
suggest that the Court’s invocations are mere rhetoric to disguise a larger theory or plan. The
language nonetheless becomes enshrined in the holdings for lower courts to erroneously subject
novel actions to an insurmountable hurdle in the form of a presumption of invalidity. See supra
notes 12–13 and accompanying text (citing and discussing the lower court rulings on the
individual mandate’s constitutionality, some of which base the conclusion on the unprecedented
argument).
165 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
166 See Brown, supra note 55, at 195 (discussing the consent theory of tradition and noting
that the “Court allocates governmental rights to the branches based on the same type of claim
and acquiescence” as adverse possession).
167 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3166
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in dissent, disagrees with the majority about the
meaning of the lack of a historical record: “Scholars, like Members of this Court, have
continued to disagree, not only about the inferences that should be drawn from the inconclusive
historical record, but also about the nature of the original disagreement.” Id.
168 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
169 Whether Chief Justice Taft was at all swayed by his former position is unclear. See
Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and
Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 735 (1987):

Most commentators explain the broad sweep of the opinion by Taft’s unique status
as the only member of the Supreme Court ever to have occupied the White House.
Yet this fact raises one last ironic question about the opinion: if the requirement of
senatorial consent for the removal of postmasters truly were an intolerable
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grant of power to the President. There is no express provision
regarding the removal of officers appointed by the President. 170 The
majority and dissenting opinions in Myers extensively reviewed the
history surrounding the question of whether the President has the sole
power to remove all executive, non-judicial officers, or whether
Congress may condition removal on the advice and consent of the
Senate. 171
The Chief Justice recognized that the Court has repeatedly laid
down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of
the Constitution . . . acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the
construction to be given its provisions.” 172 By using this as its
standard to analyze the issue before it, the Court made a historical
inquiry necessary and, similar to today’s originalists, binding. 173 The
inquiry, as with all “absence-of-precedent-equals-absence-of-power”
cases, involves two questions: the Constitution’s original meaning or
the framers’ intent and the historical practices of constitutional actors
ever since.
In 1789, the First Congress deliberated and debated about the new
government’s structure; it had to fashion a body around the skeleton.
One piece was the establishment of “three executive departments—
one of Foreign Affairs, another of the Treasury, and a third of
War.” 174 On May 19, 1789, Representative James Madison moved to

infringement upon executive power, how did Taft himself manage to ignore it during
his four years in the presidency?
170 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 109 (noting that Article II, section 4 deals only with
impeachments). Representative William Loughton Smith’s view, in 1789, was to the contrary.
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 372 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (noting Mr. Smith’s position that
the officer was to remain in office until impeached by the Senate). In the Federalist 77,
Alexander Hamilton was of the view that “[t]he consent of that body [the Senate] would be
necessary to displace as well as to appoint.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 101, at 387
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 n.114 (1994) (discussing
Hamilton’s view and the controversy surrounding it in later publications of the Federalist
Papers, some of which included a statement that qualified the position as rejected). Hamilton’s
view was not to the extreme of Smith’s, but it illustrates that by no means was there a consensus
in 1789 that the President had the sole power to remove non-judicial officers.
171 Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
172 Id. at 175 (citing cases).
173 The history used by Taft is indeed “law-office” history of the highest order. Kelly,
however, did not see an issue with it because “the essay [was not] heavily activist or
interventionist in its political overtones.” Kelly, supra note 20, at 127. But see Edward S.
Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV.
353, 399 (1927) (“In the form in which it today stands, Myers v. United States is not only a
menacing challenge to an administrative organization which represents years of planning and
experimentation in meeting modern conditions—it is a positive instigation to strife between the
President and Congress.”).
174 Myers, 272 U.S. at 111.
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create a “Department of Foreign Affairs, at the head of which there
shall be an officer . . . to be removable by the President.” 175 Mr.
Smith (of South Carolina) objected and moved to strike “to be
removed by the President” because “it declared the President alone to
have the power of removal.” 176 Madison disagreed with Smith’s
construction that impeachment was necessary for the palpable reason
that “[i]t would in effect establish every officer of the Government on
the firm tenure of good behavior[.]” 177 That, Madison stated, would
be “a fatal error interwoven in the system . . . .” 178 Dispute ensued and
four different views emerged. 179 Commenting shortly after Myers,
Edward S. Corwin noted that three separate factions—those,
including Madison, who believed, that the removal power was vested
solely in the President by the Constitution, those who believed that
removal required the advice and consent of the Senate, and those who
thought that Congress should decide under the Necessary and Proper
Clause—were fairly equal in membership. 180 Smith, who thought
removal required an impeachment, was in the minority. 181
Myers discussed the dispute and the arguments surrounding it in
depth. 182 In Chief Justice Taft’s view, the dispute was resolved
decisively in favor of Madison. 183 That was what the Chief Justice
characterized as the “decision of 1789,” 184 a decision that, according
to the Court, was binding more than one hundred years later. 185
Despite Taft’s confidence, commentators have been exceptionally
skeptical about his view of the events that took place in May of

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 370–71 (1789) (Joseph Gales, ed., 1834) (emphasis added).
Id. at 371.
177 Id. at 372.
178 Id.
179 See Corwin, supra note 173, at 361 (presenting those four views).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 361–62 n.22.
182 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 114–15 (1926) (noting “[t]he discussion was a
very full one” and “[i]t is convenient in the course of our discussion of this case to review the
reasons advanced by Mr. Madison and his associates for their conclusion”).
183 Id.at 115 (“James Madison was then a leader in the House, as he had been in the
Convention. His arguments in support of the President's constitutional power of removal
independently of Congressional provision, and without the consent of the Senate, were masterly,
and he carried the House.”).
184 Id. at 145.
185 See id. at 174–75:
175
176

It was the Congress that launched the Government. . . . It was the Congress in which
Mr. Madison, one of the first in the framing of the Constitution, led also in the
organization of the Government under it. It was a Congress whose constitutional
decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest
weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instrument.
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1789. 186 Corwin, commenting in 1927, noted that “a mere fraction of
a fraction, a minority of a minority, of the House, can be shown to
have attributed the removal power to the President on the grounds of
executive prerogative.” 187 Further, “no reliable record of the Senate
deliberations exists,” 188 and the Senate’s vote was equal, with Vice
President John Adams casting the deciding vote. 189
Furthermore, the First Congress did not create all executive offices
equally. The Department of the Treasury, unlike the Departments of
Foreign Affairs and War, was not denominated as an executive
department. 190 And the Secretary of the Treasury was to report to
either branch of the legislature “all matters referred to him by the
Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his
office.” 191 The duties of the Treasury officials were specified at great
length, which limited presidential discretion. 192 The Comptroller, an
office within the Department of Treasury, was shielded from
presidential direction. 193 At bottom, “the Myers Court[] fail[ed] to
present the complete story of the Decision of 1789.” 194
The second component of Taft’s decision was Congress’s apparent
acquiescence in the unitary executive construction. The Chief Justice
declared, “This construction was followed by the legislative
department and the executive department continuously for 73 years
. . . .” 195 But Myers was decided in 1927, not 1863, when the statute
that broke the trend, the Currency Act, was passed by Congress and

186 See Entin, supra note 169, at 716 (“Others who have reviewed the debates find the
evidence of congressional intent ambiguous indeed.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra, note 170, at 4
(“Any faithful reader of history must conclude that the unitary executive, conceived in the
foregoing way, is just myth.”); see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The
arguments drawn from the executive power of the President . . . seem to me spider’s webs
inadequate to control the dominant facts.”).
187 Corwin, supra note 173, at 362.
188 Entin, supra note 169, at 716.
189 Myers, 272 U.S. at 115 (noting that the final Senate vote was tied at ten votes in favor
and ten votes against, and that the Vice President’s vote was necessary to reach the decision).
190 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 27.
191 Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12 § 2, 1 Stat. 66 (1789).
192 See id. at §§ 1–8 (establishing the duties of Treasury Department officials).
193 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 18 n.71 (quoting Act to Establish the Treasury
Department, ch. 12, §§ 7–8, 1 Stat. 67):

The Act contained a general removal clause that stated: ‘if any person shall offend
against any of the prohibitions of this act, he shall be deemed guilty of a high
misdemeanor, . . . and shall upon conviction be removed from office.’ . . . Compare
this with the removal provision for the Secretary, which stated simply ‘[t]hat
whenever the Secretary shall be removed from office by the President,’ without
providing any limitations on the President’s removal power.
194
195

Id. at 24.
Myers, 272 U.S. at 175.
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signed by President Lincoln. 196 The Tenure of Office Act, 197 which
the postmaster statute 198 at issue in Myers was modeled after, was the
true deviation. That statute barred Vice President Johnson from
dismissing members of President Lincoln’s cabinet without the advice
and consent of the Senate. 199 Chief Justice Taft dismissed the Tenure
of Office Act because it was passed “during a heated political
difference of opinion between the then President and the majority
leaders of Congress.” 200 These heated differences involved the
Reconstruction that followed the Civil War. President Johnson, a
Democrat from Tennessee, was seen by the Radical Republicans as a
southern supporter. Taft referred to the legislation as “an attempt to
re-distribute the powers and minimize those of the President.” 201 The
Tenure of Office Act was repealed in 1887, but the postmaster
statute—a statute with which Taft the President fully complied—
lasted until Myers struck it down. 202 The President acquiesced in
conditioned removals almost as long as Congress acquiesced in the
spoils system.
Nevertheless, the Myers Court held that by Congress’s early
acquiescence and a selective—to put it politely—reading of a
decision made by its first members, Congress lost the power to
control presidential removals by conditioning them on the advice and
consent of the Senate. 203 The dissenters, Justices Holmes, Brandeis,
196 Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). The act was an attack on the spoils
system that was rampant in the national government. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 282–83 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (noting that the spoils system was the reason Congress did not condition removal
on the Senates advice and consent).
197 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, amended by Act of Apr. 5, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6
(1869), repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887).
198 Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78. The Act provided that postmasters of the
first, second, and third classes could only be removed, prior to their four year term, with the
advice and consent of the senate. Id. at § 6.
199 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867):

Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of
the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General, shall hold their
offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have
been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Johnson vetoed the bill, but it nonetheless was passed. Johnson’s defiance—firing the
Secretary of War—was the subject of his impeachment trial, at which he narrowly escaped
conviction.
200 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926).
201 Id. at 167.
202 See Entin, supra note 169, at 735–36 (footnote omitted) (“As President, Taft dismissed
scores of postmasters. In each instance he scrupulously complied with the law that he found so
obnoxious in Myers.”).
203 Myers, 272 U.S. at 165. The broad sweeps of Taft’s opinion, however, may seem
broader than they actually are. Lessig and Sunstein note three concessions made by Taft in
Myers:
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and McReynolds, thoroughly disagreed. 204 Both the inferences drawn
from and usage of (or the absence of) history were thought to be
extremely problematic by the dissenting opinions. 205 Justice Brandeis,
providing an alternative, more probable explanation noted: “The long
delay in adopting legislation to curb removals was not because
Congress accepted the doctrine that the Constitution had vested in the
President uncontrollable power over removal. It was because the
spoils system held sway.” 206
Soon after Myers, the dissenters prevailed, at least in part. In
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 207 the broad sweep of Chief
Justice Taft’s majority opinion was confined to “the narrow point
actually decided,” which was “only that the President had [the] power
to remove a postmaster of the first class.” 208The Humphrey Court held
that the agency at issue, the Federal Trade Commission, could not be
properly “characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive.” 209
Thus, the requirement that the President must show cause for removal
of one of its members did not violate the “decision of 1789.” 210 But
the Court, somewhat ominously, stated that for cases that fall between
Myers and Humphrey “there shall remain a field of doubt.” 211
June 28, 2010, more than 200 years after Madison marshaled his
arguments in the First Congress, the “decision of 1789” still

First, it said that the Civil Service Act, immunizing inferior officers from plenary
presidential control, did not offend Article II and the unitariness of the executive
branch. Second, the Court agreed that officers with adjudicative duties could be
immunized from presidential influence, even if those officers operated within the
executive branch . . . . Third, it said that Congress might be able to prevent the
President from “overruling” administrators in certain instances, even if he disagrees
with them . . . .
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 23–24. Even Solicitor General James M. Beck,
arguing for the executive, suggested that “for-cause” removals would be constitutional, what
Beck called a “middle ground.” Myers, 272 U.S. at 96 (oral argument).
204 For example, Justice McReynolds, perplexed as to the origin of this Presidential power,
noted: “I think there is no such power. Certainly it is not given by any plain words of the
Constitution; and the argument advanced to establish it seems to me forced and unsubstantial.”
Myers, 272 U.S. at 179 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
205 The dissenting opinions noted that the “decision of 1789” was not even before the
Court. See id. at 187 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (noting the issue up for debate is “inferior
officer[s]” whereas the “long-continued practice and supposed early legislative construction”
dealt with “superior officer[s]”); id. at 242 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting “the question
involved in the action taken by Congress after the great debate of 1789 is not before us”).
206 Id. at 282–83 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
207 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
208 Id. at 626.
209 Id. at 628.
210 Id. at 631.
211 Id. at 632.
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controlled. In 2002, “[a]fter a series of celebrated accounting
debacles,” 212 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 213
which “established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”) to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject
to the securities laws, and related matters.” 214 The members of the
board were appointed for defined terms by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and were removable, for cause, by the
same. 215 After the PCAOB began investigation into an accounting
firm’s procedures, the firm brought suit for a declaratory judgment,
arguing that the way PCAOB members were removed violated
separation of powers principles and was unconstitutional. 216
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 217 the Court agreed. 218 The question was one of first
impression, as the Court had never “considered a situation where a
restriction on removal passes through two levels of control.” 219 The
Supreme Court took this opportunity to revitalize Myers’s erroneous
interpretation of the “decision of 1789”: “This Decision of 1789
provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the
Constitution’s meaning since many of the Members of the First
Congress had taken part in framing that instrument. . . . And it soon
became the settled and well understood construction of the
Constitution.” 220
Undertones and express invocations of the unprecedented (or
fixed-construction) argument pervade the majority opinion. 221 The
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
214 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
215 Id. at (e)(4)–(6) (providing the procedures for appointing and removing board
members).
216 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.
217 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
218 Id. at 3147 (holding that “such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article
II’s vesting of the executive power in the President”).
219 Id. at 3149 (quotation omitted). The idea is that the SEC Commissioners are only
removable “for cause” (first level) and the Board members are also only removable “for cause.”
Thus, the President conceptually cannot remove the Board members because he lacks control of
the SEC Commissioners. That logic, however, is inherently flawed. There is no statute that says
the SEC commissioners are removable for cause. See id. at 3182–83 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Justice Breyer noted that the majority “reads into the statute books a ‘for cause removal’ phrase
that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably did not intend to
write.” Id. at 3184. That is the Avoidance Doctrine in reverse. See id. (“This is not a statutory
construction that seeks to avoid a constitutional question, but its opposite.”). But this criticism
of the majority may be out of place. Most agree that the SEC is an independent agency, the
essential characteristic of which is limited removal power of the President.
220 Id. at 1352 (majority opinion) (quotation omitted).
221 For example, “[t]his novel structure does not merely add to the Board's independence,
but transforms it.” Id. at 3154.; “[t]hat is why the Framers sought to ensure that ‘those who are
employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of
212
213
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Court was clear that the novelty of the act was practically fatal:
“Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional
problem with the PCAOB is the lack of historical precedent for this
entity.” 222
Such reliance on history would seem valid only if there was
general agreement that in 1789 the First Congress’s opinion was
clearly that the Constitution afforded the President unilateral power to
remove all non-judicial appointees, a power that could not be
qualified by later Congresses. Since the Myers decision was issued,
the “decision of 1789” and the inferences drawn from it are, at the
very least, highly controversial. 223 Myers is law-office history of the
highest order, 224 and Free Enterprise Fund reinvigorated it. 225 But, as
Corwin noted, “what a judge cannot prove he can still decide.” 226 The
numerous logical flaws in the Free Enterprise Fund majority’s
analysis seem to suggest its reverence for a divisive, narrow decision
made by Congress in 1789 was merely a “useful mask for [a]

dependence be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as
they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.’” Id. at 3155 (quoting 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison)); “The
Framers did not rest our liberties on such bureaucratic minutiae.” Id. at 3156; “The Framers
created a structure . . . .” Id. at 3157. See also id. at 3156–57 n.6 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
612 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834):
Madison’s actual proposal, consistent with his view of the Constitution, was that the
Comptroller hold office for a term of ‘years, unless sooner removed by the
President’; he would thus be ‘dependent upon the President, because he can be
removed by him,’ and also ‘dependent upon the Senate, because they must consent to
his [reappointment] for every term of years.
The list goes on.
Id. at 3159 (quotation and citation omitted). It is noteworthy that, in support of the
proposition, the dissenting Judge below cited Justice Holmes: “‘[A] page of history is worth a
volume of logic.’” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,
349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). But
given Justice Holmes’ dissent in Myers it is unlikely that he meant for his statement to transform
into a presumption of invalidity for novel actions, especially in the area of presidential power.
223 See supra notes 167–212 and accompanying text.
224 See Corwin, supra note 173, at 369 (“Viewed purely as history, the Chief Justice’s
interpretation of the decision of 1789 is without validity.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170,
at 32 (“The early Congresses' practice undermines the claim that the founding vision was
motivated by a single organizational ideal.”).
225 The Court did so, however, with little actual consequence to Congress’s scheme. The
strong language and revitalization of Myers, and its view of presidential power, may be a sign of
what the Court—or some of its members—truly has in store for independent agencies such as
the PCAOB.
226 Corwin, supra note 173, at 369.
222

4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM

2011]

CLIO ON STEROIDS

557

decision[] reached on other grounds,” 227 namely the unitary executive
philosophy. 228
Free Enterprise Fund may state a broader principle. That
principle, though misguided, is that of a presumption of
unconstitutionality for novel congressional actions. Chief Justice
Roberts does not announce that principle. The Chief Justice, however,
implicitly acknowledges that the absence of history limits Congress’s
powers by preaching the novelty of the statute in question. That
argument is expressly invoked in the Court’s federalism decisions,
which are considered next. 229
B. Federalism and the Framers
The starkest evidence of a presumption of invalidity lies in the
Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence. This Section discusses the
Court’s use of history in these cases.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 230 dealt with the centuries-old
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Florida refused to consent to be
sued under the Indian Gaming Regulation Act, which abrogated
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 231 The
issue was whether Congress could constitutionally abrogate Florida’s
sovereign immunity using its commerce power. 232
The only text related to sovereign immunity in the Constitution is
the Eleventh Amendment, which states: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Posner, supra note 18, at 593.
Aside from the Court’s questionable interpretation of both history and federal law, the
logic that one for-cause level is permissible but two is not is lacking. Put best by Justice Breyer
in dissent, the Court’s logic is “elementary arithmetical logic (i.e., ‘one plus one is greater than
one’) . . . .” Free Enter. Fund, v. Pub. Co. Accounting & Oversight Bd. 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3176
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229 Here, it is important to note that Myers and Free Enterprise Fund (and Frankfurter’s
concurrence in the Steel Seizure case) can be distinguished from the federalism decisions
discussed next (e.g., Printz). In certain cases, “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned” may justify reliance on
the absence of congressional action to infer presidential power. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In such a case,
Congress, with notice of the action, could be deemed to assent to it. See Holmes, supra note 1,
at 476 (“Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if,
after a while, the law follows his example.”). Where the history is clear to the point that the
President’s power is and has been effectively assumed for a long term of years, a “gloss” on
presidential power could be appropriate. The “decision of 1789” and the inferences that should
be drawn from it are, however, far from clear. Frankfurter’s “claim and acquiescence” theory is
considered more fully in Part IV.A infra.
230 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
231 Id. at 53–55.
232 Id. at 58.
227
228

4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM

558

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” 233 Though that amendment appears to prohibit only cases
involving diversity jurisdiction against a state, the Court has found
that it stands for the “presupposition . . . that each State is a sovereign
entity in our federal system . . . .” 234 Thus, for a state to be a
defendant in federal court it must either consent or answer to a valid
exercise of Congress’s power to abrogate sovereign immunity. In
1989, the Court held that Congress could abrogate sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause, but without a majority
opinion. 235 Seminole Tribe overruled that case, deeming it a departure
from established law. 236 The conclusion followed that Congress had
overstepped its bounds, and the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the
claim.
Four Justices disagreed. The dissent argued that state sovereign
immunity is a common law doctrine that is appropriately abrogated
by a legislature. 237 The majority responded by referring to the
dissent’s argument as a “new theory of state sovereign immunity.” 238
For example, the majority remarked that “[t]his sweeping statement
ignores the fact that the Nation survived for nearly two centuries
without the question of the existence of such power ever being
presented to this Court.” 239
The next case considered, Printz v. United States, 240 involved the
1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. 241 The act required
local chief law enforcement officers (“CLEO”) to perform
background checks on potential hand-gun purchasers for a period of
sixty months until a federal regulatory system was operational.242
Sheriff Jay Printz of Ravelli County, Montana, and Sheriff Richard
Mack of Graham County, Arizona, brought suit claiming that the
233 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment was passed after the Court’s decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XI, which held that a state could be sued in federal court by a private citizen of
another state. Id. at 479.
234 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1890));
see also id. at 54–55 n.7 (citing numerous cases).
235 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1989) (plurality opinion).
236 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
237 See id. at 102 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion was “at odds with
the Founders’ view that common law, when it was received into the new American legal system,
was always subject to legislative amendment”). In an expansive dissent, Justice Souter stakes
out this claim in detail and also casts doubt on Hans, on which the majority extensively relied.
Id.
238 Id. at 71 (majority opinion) (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 157 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
239 Id.
240 521 U.S. 898, 903 (1997).
241 Pub. L. No. 103–159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
242 Id. at 903.
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Brady Act impermissibly commandeered their state offices and
violated the Constitution’s federalism principles. 243
The question before the Court implicated far-reaching, complex
concerns about the federal structure of our government similar to
those in New York v. United States. 244 In Printz, “Because there [was]
no constitutional text speaking to this precise question,” the Court
looked to history, structure, and precedent for the answer. 245 To begin
the historical analysis, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted:
[C]ontemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution
. . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the
construction to be given its provisions. Conversely if, . . .
earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive
power, we would have reason to believe that the power was
thought not to exist. 246
That standard explicitly stated what Seminole Tribe and Myers
implied: novel government actions are presumed invalid.
The federal government and Printz both contended that the history
books supported their side. 247 The Court, after distinguishing
Id. at 904–05.
505 U.S. 144 (1992). New York invalidated a federal law that required the New York
legislature to comply with the Congress’s low-level radioactive waste laws or take title to it
because the law was so coercive it impermissibly commandeered the New York legislature. Id.
at 149, 153–54. The case before the Court in New York was arguably different because the
CLEO’s would not be mandating the check but simply performing it. Thus, the accountability
concerns of New York are mitigated. That, however, is the topic for another discussion.
245 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (emphasis added). The four dissenting Justices, led by Justice
Stevens, directly opposed that view. Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he text of
the Constitution provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition of th[is] case[].”). The
dissenting Justices argued that the Brady Act was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper
Clause since it is uncontested, aside from “the revisionist views expressed by Justice Thomas,”
that the provision is otherwise constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id. Justice Scalia
castigated the dissent for resorting to the “last, best hope to those who defend ultra vires
congressional action[s].” Id. at 923. But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting “the nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause . . .
empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its
authority to enact in isolation”). In Raich, Justice Scalia argued that Printz is distinguishable
because the issue in Raich raised no state sovereignty concerns. Id.; but see id. at 57 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (noting that “whatever the wisdom of California’s experiment with medical
marijuana, the federalism principles that have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that
room for experiment be protected in this case.”).
246 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
247 See id. (quotation and citation omitted):
243
244

Petitioners contend that compelled enlistment of state executive officers for the
administration of federal programs is, until very recent years at least, unprecedented.
The Government contends, to the contrary, that “the earliest Congresses enacted
statutes that required the participation of state officials in the implementation of
federal laws.”
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numerous historical incidents similar to the power asserted by the
Brady Act, agreed with Printz. 248 The Court held that the “utter lack”
of affirmative historical precedent “suggests an assumed absence of
such power.” 249 “[T]wo centuries of apparent congressional
avoidance of the practice,” said Justice Scalia, “tends to negate the
existence” of the power. 250
Printz’s historical analysis displayed many of the same flaws for
which Alfred H. Kelly criticized the Court in 1965. In fact, there was
arguably a fair amount of historical precedent for the government’s
action. 251 If there was so much contradictory data—indeed Justice
Scalia attempted to explain much of it away in footnotes—why was it
necessary to muddle through the history to decisively conclude
novelty? The Court could have simply extended New York, which
prohibited Congress from commandeering state legislatures, to
include the executive branch of state governments. There were strong
arguments, though not as strong as those in New York, that the Brady
Act provisions violated the Tenth Amendment and “fail[ed] to adhere
to the design and structure of our constitutional scheme.” 252 The
argument was weaker, given that the requirement’s temporariness and
reduction of the accountability concern, which was reduced because
the state officers would only be performing the federal mandate rather
than mandating a concealed federal mandate. 253 On the other hand, if
novel actions are presumed invalid, the weaker arguments easily
prevail.
A few years later, in Alden v. Maine, 254 the Court extended
Seminole Tribe to prohibit Congress from relying on the commerce
power to subject states to suits in their own courts for damages.
Alden, though analytically consistent with Seminole Tribe, indeed
almost more appropriate under the common law reasoning, 255 is
nonetheless far more troubling—in terms of historical analysis—than
Seminole Tribe. A group of probation officers sued Maine for
248 See, e.g., id. at 915 (“If it was indeed Hamilton's view that the Federal Government
could direct the officers of the States, that view has no clear support in Madison's writings, or as
far as we are aware, in text, history, or early commentary elsewhere.”); id. at 910 (noting that
“none of these statements necessarily implies” the power asserted here).
249 Id. at 907–08.
250 Id. at 918.
251 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the contradictory evidence.
252 Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
253 See supra note 245 (discussing the mitigation of the accountability concern).
254 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
255 The King cannot be brought to his own courts without consent. See id. at 741 (“In
England, the rule was well established that no lord could be sued by a vassal in his own court,
but each petty lord was subject to suit in the courts of a higher lord.” (quotation and citation
omitted)). But, Alden is a bit different because the law is federal, not state. The “King” did not
make the law.
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violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in federal court. 256 When
Seminole Tribe was decided, the federal district court dismissed the
action on state sovereignty grounds. 257 The group of probation
officers attempted to pursue their claims in state court, but each court
up through the Maine Supreme Court dismissed on the basis of
sovereign immunity. 258
After determining that the question was one of first impression, the
Court, similar to Printz, determined that “history, practice, precedent,
and the structure of the Constitution” would be the guide. 259 That
inquiry was necessary because the only textual source of sovereign
immunity in the Constitution is ambiguous. 260 The first two prongs of
the analysis can be distilled to two related questions: (1) was it the
intent or understanding at the time of the framing to allow such suits
in state court; and (2) until now, has Congress acted as if it had the
power? Under the reasoning of Printz—which the Court explicitly
cites—if both questions are answered in the negative (i.e., historical
silence), then a presumption of invalidity follows.
Justice Kennedy first noted that “the historical record gives no
instruction as to the founding generation’s intent to preserve the
States’ immunity from suit in their own courts.” 261 The inference
drawn from that statement is “that the Founders’ silence is best
explained by the simple fact that no one, not even the Constitution’s
most ardent opponents, suggested the document might strip the States
of the immunity.” 262 Alden, contrasted with Printz, provided more
analysis as to why such a sweeping inference was drawn from a blank
page. The wartime debts of the states were large. 263 Opponents
Alden, 527 U.S. at 711.
Id. at 712.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 741.
260 See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
(“Despite the narrowness of its terms, . . . we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure
which it confirms . . . .”).
261 Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.
262 Id. Justice Kennedy, the author of Alden, took the same view in oral argument:
256
257

Mr. Waxman: . . . I don’t think that there is anything in the Constitutional
Convention debates that goes to the question of suits against States in their own
courts at all, let alone under Federal law. . . .
[Justice Kennedy]: But—but that’s the point. It’s the dog that doesn’t bark argument.
And the anti-federalists didn’t bring this up either. If the Constitution had
contemplated it, certainly the anti-federalists would have made the statement.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (No. 98–346).
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 (noting “the overriding concern regarding the States’ wartime debts”).
263

4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM

562

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

attacked the Constitution with great “creativity, foresight, and vivid
imagination.” 264 Some framers “contended that no individual could
sue a sovereign without its consent.” 265 And, finally, “the furor raised
by Chisholm, and the speed and unanimity with which the [Eleventh]
Amendment was adopted . . . underscore the jealous care with which
the founding generation sought to preserve the sovereign immunity of
the States.” 266 Those points, according to the Court, made it “difficult
to conceive that the Constitution would have been adopted if it had
been understood to strip the States of immunity from suit in their own
courts and cede to the Federal Government a power to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits in these fora.” 267
The argument, which Kennedy made explicitly in oral
argument, 268 is that the dog did not bark at a possible intrusion of
state sovereign immunity during the founding; therefore, it must have
survived. That allusion, stated explicitly, although controversially, in
other cases, 269 is to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s short story Silver Blaze,
which featured Sherlock Holmes on the trail of a stolen race horse.270
The problems with the “dog that didn’t bark” argument are discussed
in Part III.C.2 infra.
Id.
Id. at 742. Justice Kennedy cites 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2d ed. 1901) (remarks
of J. Marshall) in support of that proposition. Id. That debate, which occurred during the
Virginia ratification debates, was discussed in depth by Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 264–65 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Similar to the infamous “decision of 1789,” the intent that a faithful reader of the debates would
glean is less clear. See id. at 269–70 (“Even if this adequately characterized the substance of
their views, they were a minority of those given at the Convention. Mason, Henry, Pendleton,
and Randolph all took an opposing position.”). Another reason to doubt statement’s
applicability is that the question that was being debated, suits under state law for debts owed,
was grounded in contract law, seemingly a very different question than Congress’s abrogation
of state sovereign immunity under its Article I, section 8 powers. Id.
266 Alden, 527 U.S. at 743.
267 Id.
268 See supra note 262 for the exchange in Alden’s oral argument.
269 See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 132 (2005) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396, n.23 (1991)
(“The Court has endorsed the view that Congress’ silence on questions such as this one ‘can be
likened to the dog that did not bark.’”). The efficacy of this argument—at least as applied to
legislative history—was doubted by the dissenting justices in Chisom, including Kennedy, who
composed part of the majority in Alden. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Kennedy, J., & Rehnquist, C.J.) (internal citations omitted):
264
265

Apart from the questionable wisdom of assuming that dogs will bark when
something important is happening, . . . we have forcefully and explicitly rejected the
Conan Doyle approach to statutory construction in the past. . . . We are here to apply
the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative history.
Statutes are the law though sleeping dogs lie.
270 See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1–
29 (Christopher Roden ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
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The second question (congressional practice) was similarly
answered in the negative. The Court, reiterating Printz, held that “‘the
utter lack of statutes’ subjecting States to suit, ‘suggests an assumed
absence of such power.’” 271 And the congressional practice of the
“last generation” is of “‘such recent vintage that they are no more
probative than the [FLSA] of a constitutional tradition that lends
meaning to the text. Their persuasive force is far outweighed by
almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the
practice.’” 272 The departure, Justice Kennedy held, reflects an
“erroneous view.” 273
The remaining two considerations, precedent and constitutional
structure, were similarly found—though not uncontested by the
dissent—to support Maine’s claim to sovereign immunity. 274 Alden
strongly implied, if not expressly stated, that there is a presumption of
invalidity for novel actions:
That we have, during the first 210 years of our constitutional
history, found it unnecessary to decide the question presented
here suggests a federal power to subject nonconsenting States
to private suits in their own courts is unnecessary to uphold
the Constitution and valid federal statutes as the supreme
law. 275
Seminole Tribe, Printz, Alden, and Free Enterprise Fund provide
lower courts with plenty of language to assert a presumption of
invalidity for novel actions. The judge presiding over the challenge to
the individual mandate in Florida did just that in ruling on the
government’s motion to dismiss. 276 The next Part discusses the
analytical flaws of the presumption of invalidity and argues that it
should be avoided.
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF INVALIDITY IS UNSOUND
“[W]hat history teaches are the traditions from which it developed
as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living
thing. . . . No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.” 277
Alden, 527 U.S. at 744 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–908 (1997)).
Id. (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 918) (emphasis added).
273 Id. at 745.
274 Id. at 754 (noting the “history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution”
supported the Court’s decision).
275 Id. at 757.
276 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 n.21
(N.D. Fla. 2010).
277 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
271
272
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This section discusses the logical flaws of a presumption of
invalidity for novel governmental actions. The first issue, explained
by Justice Harlan above, is that tradition is a living thing. It did not
die in 1789. American society has changed drastically since then and
will continue to change in the future. Second, what the history books
actually reveal is debatable, if not completely unclear. Such debate
invites the advocate—even the judge—to employ, consciously or not,
his or her own values and preferences to resolve it. The problem is
most obvious when political questions, purportedly decided long ago,
are “constitutionalized” by unelected Supreme Court justices.
Resolution of a historic debate about what the founders intended or
meant by non-historian Supreme Court justices should not decide
concrete cases that deal with today’s issues. That problem is then
compounded when the debate is whether the page is blank, which
elicits the third issue: As a practical matter, how is silence read?
Supreme Court justices cannot read the minds of our ancestors. Nor
can they read the collective minds of every member of Congress until
the unprecedented action was taken to ascertain why Congress waited.
Lastly, though perhaps most problematic, a presumption of invalidity
inverts the principle that the Court should defer to its coordinate
branches’ actions. This section concludes that a presumption of
invalidity is untenable and should be avoided.
A. The Dynamic Conception of Tradition
That first issue is history’s enduring and dynamic nature—indeed,
“tradition is a living thing.” 278 This Note does not argue that the
Constitution should be construed as a living document. The argument
here is narrow: history—which is dynamic and evolves over time—
should not be fixed at 1789 by the Court; doing so effectively
murders tradition in cold blood. A novel government action subjected
to a presumption of invalidity is as dead as the abacus, the typewriter,
and the Atari. The difference is that the novel government action is
likely to deal with new issues caused by new technology, which was
the death knell for things like the Atari.
The case of the Atari provides a helpful example. As one of the
first companies to develop a video game system, Atari marketed
games such as Asteroids and Pong. Those types of games did not
require government regulation regarding distribution of violent
content to minors. Fast forward roughly forty years, and there are
major concerns with games like Grand Theft Auto and Postal 2. 279
278
279

Id.
See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Violent Video Game Effects on Aggression,
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Those games, which, among other things, allow the user to “pour
gasoline over [victims], set them on fire, and urinate on them,” 280 are
cause for concern when placed in the hands of highly impressionable,
young children. Attempting to deal with that problem, California
passed a law that prevents children from purchasing, without their
guardian’s consent, such violent video games. 281
Is that law constitutional? Or does it violate the video game
maker’s (or the child’s) First Amendment rights? The law is novel
and unprecedented: no legislature, state or federal, has ever placed
restrictions on the distribution of violent expression. But that fact
reveals very little about the law’s constitutionality. Video games that
allow the user to perform violent and sadistic actions to virtual
humans were not available to our Founding Fathers’ children. 282
Indeed, such games were not available until very recently. There is no
way of knowing what the founders, or anyone in 1789, would have
thought about restricting children’s access to these games.
But that is the precise question the unprecedented argument elicits:
“Was there any indication that anybody thought, when the First
Amendment was adopted, that there . . . was an exception to it for . . .
speech regarding violence?” 283 That question is unhelpful because
there is nothing in history, especially in pre-1800, even remotely
similar to Grand Theft Auto or Postal 2. A person could make threats
or falsely yell fire in a crowded parlor, but those utterances are not

Empathy, and Prosocial Behavior in Eastern and Western Countries: A Meta-Analytic Review,
136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 151, 171 (2010) (noting that societal “debates can and should finally move
beyond the simple question of whether violent video game play is a causal risk factor for
aggressive behavior; the scientific literature has effectively and clearly shown the answer to be
‘yes.’”); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 app. at 2771–79 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (compiling lists of studies that support that violent video games are
harmful, in Appendix A, and refute that contention, in Appendix B, with the vast majority of
studies supporting rather than refuting the proposition).
280 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.Ct.
2729 (2011) No. 08–1448 (Roberts, C.J.).
281 See CAL. CIV. CODE §1746.1 (West 2009) (“A person may not sell or rent a video game
that has been labeled as a violent video game to a minor.”). The Supreme Court held the
requirement unconstitutional in Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2741–42.
282 Justice Alito pointed this out in oral argument when counsel was asked by Justice
Scalia if there was any history at the time of the framing to support the law. See supra note 41
for the exchange.
283 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at 17 (Scalia, J.). Note, that while this
Note advocates against using the law’s novelty to strike it down (i.e., not asking the question
Scalia asked in oral argument), that point does not suggest that the law is constitutional merely
because there is a new problem. It may well be overbroad, vague, or simply violate First
Amendment principles. See, e.g., Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2742–42 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment) (finding that the law was impermissible vague, but leaving open the possibility
that a narrower drawn law could be constitutional). There may be issues with line drawing (e.g.,
are movies next?). But the law should not be dead on arrival merely because it is new.
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protected speech. 284 One could paint a violent picture or write a
violent book, but there was no medium to express—or act out—
violence like Xbox or PlayStation, especially one marketed towards
the young. The First Amendment rights of the purveyors of such
violent expression (or of children playing the games) were never
debated. The conclusion follows that laws were never passed to
curtail those rights. Despite the historic dearth of violent video games,
the Supreme Court found that there was no traditional First
Amendment exception for violent expression (analogizing games like
Postal 2 to Snow White and Cinderella), subjected the California law
to strict scrutiny, and invalidated it. 285 Whether the law passes
constitutional muster should not depend on such an arbitrary inquiry
that can only have one answer.
B. Law-Office History Applied
Even if the presumption of invalidity is appropriate, the issue of
ambiguous history—and the Court’s struggle with historical
accuracy—remains. It is one thing for Justices to debate the meaning
and import of the Court’s own decisions. 286 That is their expertise.
But with respect to historical assertions of fact, there is cause for
concern. The problem was recognized by historian Alfred H. Kelly in
1965. 287 Judges are ill-equipped to decide historical questions in
general. That concern is amplified when the historical assertion is
what did not happen or was not said, especially when there is valid
disagreement.
This is not to say there is no place for history. Demonstrated in
Part I and reiterated here, history can be extremely informative of, for
example, what works, what does not, and what is good, bad, or ugly.
The Court, however, must be candid and objective when it uses
history as authority. 288 If the historical facts are clearly contradicted
or ambiguous, the Court should follow the lead of one of its most
284 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curium) (holding that true
threats are unprotected speech, but not political hyperbole that contains a threat); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (acting under the pre-Brandenburg formulation of the
clear and present danger test, noting that a person could not falsely yell fire in a crowded theatre
with constitutional immunity).
285 Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2741–42 (invalidating the legislation because was
underinclusive for allowing a parental veto, and overinclusive because it violates the First
Amendment rights of young people).
286 See supra note 19 (discussing Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) and the majority and dissent’s disagreement over which
decision comports with the Court’s famous holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954)).
287 See supra Part I.C (discussing law-office history).
288 This argument is expanded in Part IV infra.
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noteworthy opinions: Brown v. Board of Education. 289 In 1953, when
the Court ordered re-argument, 290 it asked about the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, specifically, whether the framers of the
amendment intended to outlaw segregation or thought that a future
Court could do so. 291 Kelly, who assisted writing the NAACP’s brief
for re-argument, noted that the result was “elaborate pieces of lawoffice history” on both sides. 292 The Court’s response—the correct
one—was to dismiss the history as inconclusive. 293 Kelly’s “halfeducated guess” was “that the competing briefs exposed too grossly
. . . the entire fallacy of law-office history.” 294 Whether or not that
was the Court’s reasoning, today’s Court should take heed. The
modern Court’s opinions—and attacks in footnotes—demonstrate the
embarrassment the Court saved itself from in Brown.
For example, in Printz the Court took fourteen pages to assert that
commandeering state and local executives was a novel exercise of
power. 295 First, did the framers mention it? In Federalist 27, Hamilton
noted: “The plan reported by the convention, by extending the
authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several
States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy
of each, in the execution of its laws.” 296 Later, in the same paragraph,
Hamilton stated:
It merits particular attention . . . that the laws of the
Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of
its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land;
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See FELDMAN, supra note 99, at 371–405, for an interesting discussion of the reasoning
for re-argument. Feldman recounts Chief Justice Warren’s wish to issue a unanimous opinion
and the need to convince some justices (or outlive them). Id. at 399–400.
291 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953) (order for re-argument) (stating
the first question as, “1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State
legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not
contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public
schools?”).
292 Kelly, supra note 20, at 144.
293 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93 (“In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation.”); Kelly, supra note 20, at 144 (“[T]he Court
rejected history in favor of sociology.”).
294 Kelly, supra note 20, at 145.
295 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–18. The Printz majority’s painting of history
is criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 36, at 963–73 (criticizing the Printz
majority’s use of history); Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023,
1084 (2002) (describing the “seemingly biased interpretation of historical materials considered
by the Justices in rendering their decision”).
296 THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 101, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
added).
289
290
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to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive,
and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an
oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the
respective members, will be incorporated into the operations
of the national government as far as its just and
constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered
auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. 297
Those passages seem clear enough. At a minimum, Hamilton’s
discussion showed that the governmental action taken in Printz was
not thought forbidden. The majority discounted Hamilton’s essays as
coming “from the pen of the most expansive expositor of federal
power.” 298 According to Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, “[t]o
choose Hamilton’s view, as Justice Souter [dissenting] would, is to
turn a blind eye to the fact that it was Madison’s—not Hamilton’s—
that prevailed.” 299
So apparently the question is: What did Madison think? In
Federalist 44, responding to the question of why state executives and
legislators must be bound by oath to the Constitution, Madison stated,
“The members and officers of the State governments . . . will have an
essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution.”300
Madison went on to note that the election of federal officers
necessarily depended on the states. 301 In Federalist 45, Madison, after
discussing the limited number of federal employees, noted, “[i]ndeed
it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the
organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be
clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.” 302 The
position is somewhat ambiguous, but it does not support the assertion
that Madison viewed commandeering state executives prohibited by
the Constitution. Indeed, four Justices—and commentators—read the
history quite differently than the Printz majority. 303
Id. at 136–37.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 915 n.9.
299 Id.
300 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 101, at 233 (James Madison).
301 Id.
302 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 101, at 237 (James Madison).
303 See, e.g.¸ Printz, 521 U.S. at 954 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
297
298

Indeed, despite the exhaustive character of the Court’s response to this dissent, it has
failed to find even an iota of evidence that any of the Framers of the Constitution or
any Member of Congress who supported or opposed the statutes discussed in the text
ever expressed doubt as to the power of Congress to impose federal responsibilities
on local judges or police officers.
see also, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the
Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 512 (2004) (noting

4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM

2011]

CLIO ON STEROIDS

569

That “none of these statements necessarily implies . . . that
Congress could impose the[] responsibilities without the consent of
the States” 304 is true. That formulation, whether the Federalist Papers
necessarily imply the power, is far too narrow. Even discounting
Hamilton’s view, simply because Madison was ambiguous in the
Federalist Papers should not strip Congress of a power. Thus, it is
appropriate to inquire, as both the majority and dissent did, into
historical practice because evidence of historical thought is
ambiguous.
As evidence of historical practice to the contrary, the majority
cited an early law that recommended state legislatures allow federal
prisoners to be housed in state jails with which Georgia refused to
comply. 305 That incident only shows that the federal government
made the political decision to rent a jail in Georgia to house its
prisoners. 306 Asserting that the action implies acknowledgement of a
lack of power to compel is identical to “reliance upon unexpressed
legislative intent.” 307 Moreover, there are other early statutes that
seemed to bolster the government’s position that commandeering was
constitutional: for example, for the transportation of fugitives; 308 for
determination of the condition of seafaring vessels; 309 and for
requiring state courts and court clerks to perform naturalization
services. 310 To distinguish those acts, the majority narrowed them to
mere adjudicatory functions performed by courts rather than the
executive functions performed by government agencies. 311 Justice
Stevens in dissent, however, noted that some of those statutes
required courts to act like contemporary regulatory agencies. 312 But

that “the national government can legitimately commandeer state officials under the original
meaning of the Constitution, because commandeering was a necessary tool under the Articles
and because the Framers assumed that the commandeering would continue”); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2004 (1993) (“The
ratification history indicates that both the Constitution’s supporters and detractors understood
that state officers could be called into federal service. In other words, delegates who voted for or
against the Constitution may have been aware that the federal government possessed the
authority to commandeer state officers.”).
304 Printz, 521 U.S. at 910–11 (emphasis added).
305 Id. at 909–10.
306 See id at 910 (noting that when Georgia failed to comply with the request that the
federal government rented a temporary jail until the completion of the permanent one).
307 SCALIA, supra note 48, at 21 (discussing the ills of searching for legislative intent).
308 Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
309 Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131(1790).
310 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
311 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 908 n.2 (noting that “[n]one of the early statutes directed to state
judges or court clerks required the performance of functions more appropriately characterized as
executive than judicial . . . ”).
312 See id. at 950–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that an early law requiring state
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the majority chastised Justice Stevens for “mistak[ing] the copy for
the original, . . . [by believing] that 18th-century courts were imitating
agencies, rather than 20th-century agencies imitating courts.” 313 But
what is a label but a label? If either the twentieth-century agency or
eighteenth-century court was administering the law it is nonetheless
an executive function. 314
The Brady Act is not the only modern statute that requires this
“cooperative federalism.” 315 The Court dismissed the modern statutes
because “[t]heir persuasive force is far outweighed by almost two
centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice.” 316
This Note’s purpose is not to prove the Printz majority or
dissenting opinion’s view of the history books. That task—if it can
even be achieved—is best suited for a professional historian. The
objective is to show that the history is unclear. The infamous
“decision of 1789” provides another example. 317 Printz, Alden,
Myers, and Free Enterprise Fund illustrate the danger of affording
historical silence such great weight in constitutional adjudication. The
familiar adage that “history is written by the victors” 318 describes the
issue well. Ambiguous history, with “more or less apt quotations from
respected sources on each side of any question,” 319 invites judges to
fill in the gaps, or choose sides, based on political or policy
preferences.
When the assertion is that the history books are silent, there are
two gaps that must be filled: the ambiguity (i.e., that in fact nothing
was said or done) and the negative inference from the silence (i.e.,
that the silence means that some action cannot be done). The extra
leap compounds the problem of law-office history. If historical
silence—indeed, intensely debated silence—yields a presumption of
invalidity, then the dead hand of the past assumes an authoritative

courts to “certify[] the seaworthiness of vessels” required those courts “to serve, functionally,
like contemporary regulatory agencies” in that “[t]he statute set forth . . . procedures for an
expert inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise more characteristic of
executive activity”).
313 Id. at 909 n.2 (majority opinion).
314 Indeed, the text of the naturalization statute required the court to administer the oath
and record the application. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (requiring courts to
administer the oath and the clerk of court to record the application).
315 See Nichol, supra note 36, at 966 n.106 (listing other modern examples).
316 Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
317 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the “decision of 1789.”
318 Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 275 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
319 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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position over the living that cannot be justified in a modern, ever
changing society.
C. Law-Office History and Blank Pages
The issue discussed above is the difficulty in determining what the
history books actually reveal. That issue is present whenever history
is used as authority. Indeed, it is a reason to limit the weight given to
history. When history is silent, the concern is amplified. Printz and
Alden, which not only weigh historical silence heavily but also
negatively, exhibit the flaws of the unprecedented argument. The
conclusion in Printz, later reiterated in Alden, was that the
unprecedented nature of the action “tend[ed] to negate the existence
of the congressional power asserted . . . .” 320 That conclusion raises
two questions: (1) even if the unprecedented nature is uncontroverted,
why is the import negative; and (2) how can the import be a
presumption of invalidity when congressional laws are typically
presumed to be valid (in other words, why is the import two “clicks”
towards invalidity rather than just one)? The former question is
addressed here, the latter in the next section and more fully in Part IV.
1. Printz and the Highly Attractive Power
If it was clear that the Brady Act was the first time since the
Constitution’s ratification that Congress enlisted state executives into
service by compulsion, then that novelty could mean one of two
things: (1) Congress historically thought that it did not have the power
to do so; or (2) Congress has yet to find it necessary and proper to do
so. The Printz Court found that the historical import was the
former. 321 But the latter conclusion is both consistent with judicial
deference and the presumption of validity, and has greater support in
the country’s history. To support the conclusion that the lack of
historical precedent equals a lack of power, Justice Scalia denotes the
power to compel state executives to carry out federal law as a “highly
attractive power.” 322 That seems like a reasonable argument: A young
child does not drive a car—despite the attractiveness of untamed
mobility—because he or she does not have the power or cannot drive
the car, perhaps because the child too small, has no license, or is not
permitted to do so by his or her parents.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
See id.(finding that the lack of congressional action “tends to negate the existence of the
congressional power asserted”).
322 Id. at 905; see also id. at 908 (noting “the attractiveness of that course to Congress”).
320
321
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The attractiveness of driving is obvious. A typical teenager cannot
wait until the day her parents let her behind the wheel. The
attractiveness of commandeering state and local executives, on the
other hand, is less clear. The Constitution was not this country’s first
attempt to unify the several states. In 1781, the states ratified the
Articles of Confederation, which “established a central government
for the United States . . . [where] the States retained most of their
sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by
treaties.” 323 Unlike the Constitution, the Articles gave the central
government no power directly over the people, only over the states
themselves. 324 And “[t]o put its laws into effect, the Continental
Congress had to impress state officials and local committees.” 325
Indeed, the opponents of the Constitution supported that method. 326 If
the embarrassments of the Articles precipitated the Constitution’s
ratification, why is a power that proved inefficient and inadequate
“highly attractive” to Congress post-1789? 327 If the hypothetical child
stole his father’s keys and went for a drive, but crashed the car and
ended up seriously injured, it is unlikely that driving would be
“highly attractive” a few weeks after she left the hospital. It is
similarly disingenuous to attach a negative inference to congressional
avoidance of a practice that proved inefficient and cumbersome pre1789.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Printz, provided a persuasive
political-process rationale for the purported absence of historical
practice. 328 Justice Stevens noted:
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
Id. (“It soon became clear that the Confederation was without adequate power to collect
needed revenues or to enforce the rules its Congress adopted.”).
325 Johnson, supra note 304, at 484 (emphasis added).
326 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 101, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that
the league contended for by the opponents only would have authority to “operate upon the
States in their political or collective capacities”).
327 Implicit in that question is the question of whether the federal government gave up the
power over the states by gaining power over private individuals. On this point compare Printz,
521 U.S. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The basic change in the character of the government
that the Framers conceived was designed to enhance the power of the National Government, not
to provide some new, unmentioned immunity for state officers.”), and Johnson, supra note 304,
at 473 (“The national government was to have all of the powers under the Constitution that it
had under the Articles of Confederation, plus more.”), with Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 n.10
(quoting Prakash, supra note 304, at 1972) (asserting that “‘[w]here the Constitution intends that
our Congress enjoy a power once vested in the Continental Congress, it specifically grants it.’”)
Both accounts are of the “law-office” variety and both are plausible explanations. The inference
this Note draws from the transition is simpler: why would a power that everybody concluded
was inadequate to fully govern the several states, as sovereigns, be highly attractive shortly after
vast new powers are bestowed? Even if the inference that the power would be unattractive is too
much, the Court’s inference—that the power was highly attractive—is also too much.
328 Printz, 521 U.S. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323
324
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Indeed, an entirely appropriate concern for the prerogatives of
state government readily explains Congress’ sparing use of
this otherwise “highly attractive” . . . power. Congress’
discretion, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, indicates not
that the power does not exist, but rather that the interests of
the States are more than sufficiently protected by their
participation in the National Government. 329
The political-process rationale is simple: because Congress represents
the people of the several states and is accountable to them “it is quite
unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of
their constituents.” 330 Whether the political process alone is sufficient
to uphold the Brady Act is another question. The point here is that the
political nature of the decision to enlist state bureaucracies shows one
reason why Congress would shy away from using the commandeering
power. 331 Either the states’ interests in being free from federal
mandates or the efficiency of having the federal executive branch
administer federal law could have been the reason that Congress has
rarely commandeered state executives. Whatever the reason for
Congress’s hesitation, the Court should not infer that it was because
Congress assumed it lacked the power.
2. Sherlock Holmes and the Constitution
The Court’s state sovereign immunity decision in Alden also drew
a negative inference from historical silence. 332 There, too, the
inference was misguided. In Alden, the unprecedented nature of the
question is less controversial. The dissent and majority disagreed
principally about the import of that historical silence. The majority,
citing Printz, 333 decided it was negative. 334

Id. at 953 n.12 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 956. But see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that recent political and structural changes “have made
Congress increasingly less representative of state and local interests, and more likely to be
responsive to the demands of various national constituencies”).
331 See Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and
the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT.
355, 379 (1998) (asserting a similar point regarding requisitions and noting, “[w]hether or not a
system of requisitions is a good idea—and most founders thought not—it is not necessarily
unconstitutional”).
332 See supra notes 255–77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Alden.
333 Alden cites Printz for the proposition that the absence of historical “practice” elicits a
negative inference. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999).
334 Id. at 745. The import in Printz and Alden, when looked at from the state’s perspective,
is actually positive. As in, the import grants the State’s rights that are not enshrined in the text of
the Constitution or affirmatively granted to them by history.
329
330
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The Court in Alden advanced the following justifications for a
negative inference regarding the historical silence in the debate: (1)
the heavily indebted states at the time of the framing; (2) the creative
opponents to ratification; and (3) “the furor raised by Chisholm, and
the speed and unanimity with which the [Eleventh] Amendment was
adopted.” 335 The argument—made by Justice Kennedy in oral
argument 336 and again, albeit less explicit, in his opinion 337—is that
the “dog didn’t bark” during the convention and therefore state
sovereign immunity must have survived it.
As mentioned earlier, that analogy is to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s
short story Silver Blaze, in which Silver Blaze, a famous race horse,
disappeared from its stable and its trainer, John Straker, was
murdered. 338 Sherlock Holmes, tasked with solving the crime, soon
learned that the dog kept in Silver Blaze’s stable did not bark on the
night of the incident. 339 That led Holmes to conclude that “the
midnight visitor was someone whom the dog knew well.” 340 It was
Straker himself who removed Silver Blaze from the stable, not his
assailant. 341
The inference’s applicability to the Founders—as dogs, guarding
state sovereign immunity—is tenuous, at best. Justice Kennedy
supposes that the anti-federalists would have “barked” if they thought
the Constitution altered the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 342
The main flaw is the ambiguity as to why the “dog” stayed silent. One
possibility is, as the Alden Court concluded, that the Constitution did
not alter state sovereign immunity. That conclusion presupposes that
there is something (a Silver Blaze) for the anti-federalists (the dog) to
protect. For the negative inference to be appropriate, that object must
be constitutional or inherent state sovereign immunity, not a common
law doctrine that could be modified by later legislators.
But there is no evidence that the framers intended to
constitutionalize the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in
the first instance. 343 Furthermore, “the Framers chose to recognize

335 Id. at 741–743. The Court’s reasoning is discussed more fully in supra notes 255–77
and accompanying text..
336 See supra note 263 for Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Alden’s oral argument.
337 See supra text accompanying note 262–63.
338 DOYLE, supra note 271, at 3.
339 Id. at 23.
340 Id. at 27.
341 Id. Holmes’s ultimate conclusion regarding Straker’s death is that Silver Blaze killed
him by a kick when Straker attempted to operate on the horse. Id. at 29. Straker was up to no
good, and wanted to cut one of the horse’s tendons before a race to pay off a debt. Id. at 27–28.
342 See supra note 263 for Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Alden’s oral argument.
343 Explained by Justice Souter dissenting:
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only particular common-law concepts, such as the writ of habeas
corpus . . . and the distinction between law and equity . . . by specific
reference in the constitutional text.” 344 Indeed, if the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity was so well ingrained, two puzzling questions
remain. First, how could four justices in Chisholm v. Georgia 345
conclude that a citizen could sue a state without any abrogation of
immunity by Congress? 346 And second, though Alden cited the rapid
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment after Chisholm in support of the
negative inference, 347 why were the framers of that amendment not
explicitly clear that states have sovereign immunity, and that the
sovereign immunity cannot be abrogated by the supreme federal
government?
Perhaps, as in Silver Blaze, the dog stayed silent because it knew
the intruder; the anti-federalists knew the Constitution would give
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The
principal problem with the “dog that doesn’t bark” argument is that it
attempts to read our ancestors’ minds from a blank slate and in doing
so presupposes the conclusion. 348
Extracting hard conclusions from silence suffers from worse
analytical flaws than the traditional version of law-office history (i.e.,
the cherry-picking of favorable facts). Perhaps the “dog” stayed silent
because it accepted the Constitution’s revocation of state sovereign

[Such] silence does not tell us that the Framers’ generation thought the prerogative
so well settled as to be an inherent right of States, and not a common law creation. It
says only that at the conventions, the issue was not on the participants’ minds
because the nature of sovereignty was not always explicitly addressed.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 772–73 n.12 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
344 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137–38 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
345 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
346 See id. at 479 (holding, in a 4–1 decision that Georgia was subject to a collection suit by
the executor of the creditor’s estate).
347 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 743 (stating that “the furor raised by Chisholm, and the speed
and unanimity with which the [Eleventh] Amendment was adopted . . . underscore the jealous
care with which the founding generation sought to preserve the sovereign immunity of the
States”).
348 The “dog that doesn’t bark” argument has been criticized by members of the Court
when used to ascertain what present day members of Congress intended. See Harrison v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) (“In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot,
in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.”). But see
City of Rancho Palos Verdes, v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 132 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (“The Court has
endorsed the view that Congress’ silence on questions such as this one ‘can be likened to the
dog that did not bark.’”).
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immunity. Perhaps the “dog” assumed that states had immunity from
suits unless Congress said otherwise. Whatever the reason for the
“dog’s” silence, the attribution of such a strong state sovereign
immunity conception suggests that the conclusion came first, and the
argument second. Even if that is not the case, use of the framers’
silence to suppress the current Congress’s power is unwise.
The Court’s negative inference based on historical silence was
problematic in both Printz and Alden. The next Part discusses the
magnitude of the inference, a further layer compounding the problem.
D. Presumption of Restraint
In Blodgett v. Holden, 349 Justice Holmes remarked, “when this
Court [undertakes] to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional, I
suppose that we all agree that to do so is the gravest and most delicate
duty that this Court is called on to perform.” 350 Cases like Printz,
Alden, and Free Enterprise Fund suggest that the current Court no
longer agrees with Justice Holmes. Even assuming that the Court was
justified to draw a negative inference in those cases, how can that
inference rise to the level of a presumption of invalidity when
Congress’s actions are “presume[d] in favour of its validity, until its
violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt.” 351 In Justice Stone’s famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 352 he made no exception for laws that burden
states’ rights. 353 Perhaps around 1980, when National League of
Cities v. Usery 354 was not yet discredited, such an exception to the
presumption may have been justified if a law infringed on the states
as states. 355 Garcia seems to have laid that question to rest. 356 Even if
275 U.S. 142 (1927).
Id. at 147–48.
351 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 956 n.17 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘Whenever called upon to judge
the constitutionality of an Act of Congress—‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court
is called upon to perform,’ Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)—the
Court accords ‘great weight to the decisions of Congress.’ Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).’” (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981)).
352 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
353 See id. at 152 n.4 (Stone, J.) (discussing situations when there is a “narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality . . . ”).
354 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
355 See id. at 855 (holding that the federal government cannot regulate an “integral portion
of . . . governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally
afforded their citizens”).
356 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (“State
sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
349
350
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the Court meant for its presumption of invalidity to be limited to
federalism issues, the language does not support that conclusion. 357
Thus, the issue is, assuming a negative inference could or should
be drawn from silence, why does the inference move two “clicks”
towards invalidity? A much more defensible position would be to
defer slightly less to the congressional or executive judgment when
reviewing novel actions. The Court must never forget that:
In striking the balance the relevant considerations must be
fairly, which means coolly, weighed with due regard to the
fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is
sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath
to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility
for carrying on government. 358
The next Part elaborates on the competing presumption of validity
most congressional actions should be entitled to and the appropriate
level of doubt, if any, the novelty of a law should carry.
IV. REVIEWING NOVEL ACTIONS: CANDID RESTRAINT
This Part sketches a blueprint for reviewing novel actions. In aid
of that task, the first section reviews instances where the Court’s use
of historical silence was more justifiable. The next section, with these
contrasting situations in mind, discusses the analytical steps a court
should take to evaluate the “unprecedented” argument. Analyzed
candidly, with the appropriate level of deference and a keen sense of
judicial restraint, the “unprecedented” argument loses much of the
force allotted to it by Printz and Alden. This Note concludes by
returning to the individual mandate, which opponents of the policy
have forcefully contended has no prior precedent, 359 and suggests that
attention should be shifted away from the unprecedented question.

structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”).
357 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 n.21
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (noting there may be presumption of invalidity for the novel individual
mandate, which regulates individuals, not states).
358 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
359 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing examples of claims by opponents of
the individual mandate that it is unprecedented and an unconstitutional expansion of federal
power).
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A. Clio’s Gentler Side
In the landmark prior restraint case Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 360 the Court was faced with a Minnesota law that imposed a
prior restraint on publication. After an analysis of the law’s effect and
a discussion of uncontroverted historical evidence that prior restraints
were considered problematic by the framers, towards the end of the
opinion, the Court stated: “The fact that for approximately one
hundred and fifty years there has been almost an entire absence of
attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications relating to
the malfeasance of public officers is significant of the deep-seated
conviction that such restraints would violate constitutional right.”361
Though Chief Justice Hughes’s statement sounds similar to Printz,
taken in context, it is more justifiable. 362 The First Amendment is
vague and does not explicitly state: “no prior restraints.” 363 Because
of that ambiguity, the Court found it necessary to consider “the
conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed.” 364
The history—the intention of the framers and historical practice—
was much less ambiguous than the Court’s current expeditions into
the history books. Indeed, the dissenters did not argue the majority
looked at the wrong history; they argued that “[t]he Minnesota statute
does not operate as a previous restraint on publication within the
proper meaning of that phrase.” 365 The disagreement was policy
based. 366 The Court quoted Blackstone’s view: “‘The liberty of the
press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published.’” 367 Blackstone’s
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Id. at 718.
362 Near was nevertheless a narrow majority. But the disagreement was not about the
history. Further, it was clear that neither the majority nor dissent would have rested its
conclusion on history. The dissent did, however, argue that the Court’s decision was without
prior precedent. See id. at 723 (Butler, J., dissenting) (stating that the decision “put upon the
States a federal restriction that is without precedent”).
363 The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend I.
364 Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
365 Id. at 735 (Butler, J., dissenting).
366 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 377 (1941) (noting
that the “dissenting opinion emphasized the practical need for such legislation”). The dissent
did, however, argue that Joseph Story agreed with their formulation that a previous restraint is
authorized if the publication is “duly adjudged to constitute a nuisance.” Near, 283 U.S. at 735
(Butler, J., dissenting).
367 Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (quoting 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52).
360
361
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formulation was echoed by Madison. 368 The Court’s well-supported
conclusion was: “The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a
strong light the general conception that liberty of the press,
historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has
meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints or censorship.” 369
Another reason less deference should be afforded to the legislature
is that the action was challenged under the First Amendment. The
presumption of validity takes a narrower scope when laws that
directly infringe on explicit constitutional rights, such as the freedom
of the press, are reviewed. 370 The Minnesota law in Near allowed
public officials to suppress “charges against public officers of official
dereliction . . . unless the owner or publisher is able . . . to satisfy the
judge that the charges are true and are published with good motives
and for justifiable ends.” 371 Not only is that law vague, but it is the
antithesis of a free press. One principal purpose of the press is to
expose and bring to light dereliction of duty by public officials.372
Less deference to the legislature—one group of public officials the
law would protect—is entirely appropriate. It would not go too far to
say that the Minnesota law was a self-interested transaction by the
legislature.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Court’s reasoning was
clear that the decision did not hinge on the novelty of the act in
question. The novelty of Minnesota’s law did not render it

See also CHAFEE, supra note 367, at 9–12 for a discussion of how Blackstone’s theory “dies
hard,” and noting that the conception is inadequate on two fronts: an unlimited freedom from
previous restraints “goes altogether too far in restricting state action,” and “[o]n the other hand,
. . . the Blackstonian definition gives very inadequate protection to the freedom of expression.”
Chafee does, however, note that “nobody has objected that immunity from previous restraints
does not deserve special emphasis.” Id. at 379.
368 See Near, 283 U.S. at 714 (noting Madison’s view that freedom of the press requires
freedom from previous restraints).
369 Id. at 716.
370 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 n.4 (1938) (citing
Near, 283 U.S. at 713–714, 718–720, 722) (recognizing less deference when the law is a
“restraint[] upon the dissemination of information”).
371 Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added).
372 See id. at 718–20 (noting that “[p]ublic officers[’] . . . character and conduct remain[s]
open to debate and free discussion in the press”); id. at 719–20:
[T]he administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for
malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious
proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the
impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and
official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press,
especially in the great cities.
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presumptively invalid; the fact that the law operated as “the essence
of censorship” was the nail in the coffin. 373 The novelty of the action
was merely the last layer of dirt on the grave.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Steel Seizure case, asserted
that:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on
“executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II. 374
That formulation contemplates the use of Congress’s historic silence
to vest power in the President, thereby reducing the powers of
Congress. 375 But Frankfurter was clear that “long-continued
acquiescence of Congress . . . ” is required, 376 a position different
than that advanced in Printz and Alden. Here, Justice Kennedy’s “dog
that doesn’t bark” argument has more force. 377 If Presidents have
acted as if they possess a certain power for a long period, Congress
would undoubtedly be aware of it. That awareness would alert
Congress that it is in danger of losing the power to control that aspect
of the executive branch. 378 Such awareness is presupposed by
acquiescence.
When matters of national policy are concerned, there is no alert
that Congress could lose a power by failing to use that power. For
example, in Printz there was no reason for Congress to believe that by
not commandeering state and local executives it would lose the power
to do so in the future. Further, there was nobody (i.e., society, a
branch of government, or the states) relying on Congress’s lack of
exertion. Questions regarding the balance of power between Congress

Id. at 713.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the claim
and acquiescence theory, which holds that long standing congressional or executive practice
suggests that the practice is constitutional).
375 The loss of power is also different than a scope of federal power case. If the “gloss” was
inferred onto the President’s powers, thereby removing an aspect of control from the Congress’s
ambit, the federal government as a whole is not precluded from exercising some power.
Congress is only restricted from controlling the President.
376 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
377 See supra note 263 and accompanying text for Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Alden’s
oral argument.
378 Cf. Steel Seizure., 343 U.S. at 635–636 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting the possibility
of implied powers of the President).
373
374
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and the President are far more complex. As Frankfurter noted at the
beginning of his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case:
Before the cares of the White House were his own, President
Harding is reported to have said that government after all is a
very simple thing. He must have said that, if he said it, as a
fleeting inhabitant of fairyland. The opposite is the truth. A
constitutional democracy like ours is perhaps the most
difficult of man’s social arrangements to manage
successfully. 379
Frankfurter’s position, in conjunction with his expertise in history and
stalwart sense of judicial restraint, is a defensible position indeed.
The Supreme Court’s conception of and inferences drawn from the
“decision of 1789” provides an example of Frankfurter’s reasoning
gone awry. 380 The original meaning and Congress’s historic practice
is far from clear. The Court’s recent revival of the Myers Court’s
questionable conception of the “decision of 1789” exhibits the flaws
of law-office history. It also shows the need for the principles of
candor, consistency, and restraint when the Court elevates history—
especially the absence thereof—to have a binding effect.
B. Candid Restraint
This Note proposes two principles for reviewing novel actions:
candor and consistency. Those principles, applied with a philosophy
of judicial restraint, are exceedingly important in a time when society
is evolving and changing more rapidly than ever before. Amazing
advancements in technology and communications have figuratively
reduced the size of the World. 381 Human interaction is different than
at the time of the framing. The problems we deal with today are
different from those dealt with in 1789, 1889, or even 1989. And they
are different from problems that future generations will deal with in
2089 or 2189. “[T]radition is a living thing.” 382 Indeed, “[i]t is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV.” 383 Justice Holmes’s logic has

Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the infamous “decision of 1789.”
381 See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twentyfirst Century 51–200 (1st updated and expanded ed. 2006) (discussing recent events that have
figuratively “flattened the world,” such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the invention of the World
Wide Web, and the proliferation of wireless technology).
382 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
383 Holmes, supra note 1, at 469.
379
380
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equal force with respect to the late eighteenth century. 384 Writing in
1789 to James Madison on the subject, Thomas Jefferson stated, “it
may be proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or
even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living
generation.” 385
As a threshold matter, both principles must be applied with a sense
of restraint and “a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and
the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to
presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the constitution
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.” 386
The first principle—candor—requires that history is not used as a
“mask for decisions reached on other grounds.” 387 But “[g]eneral
propositions do not decide concrete cases.” 388 Candor, as a general
proposition, requires a judge to start at the beginning when looking at
history without a conclusion already in mind. If the judge has
predetermined on policy grounds what the disposition of a case
should be, candor is a “fleeting inhabitant of fairyland.” 389 It is
dubious when half of the Court (and commentary) has one
interpretation of words said or actions taken and the other half of the
Court (and commentary) holds another usually diametrically opposite
view. That alignment, which usually coincides with the ideological
divide on the Court, may be the first clue that candor is lacking.
The first question a reviewing court should ask is whether the
action is incontrovertibly unprecedented. If not, the Court should not
base its decision on one interpretation of the history. Disputed novelty
should absolutely not presume invalidity. Truly disputed novelty—or
history in general—should not play into the analytical equation at
all. 390 What happened in the past, when undisputed, is a “convenient

384 See Posner, supra note 18, at 580 (asserting that referring to ancient laws “isn’t
fundamentally different from the belief held by a great many modern American lawyers, judges,
and law professors that the answers to modern questions of constitutional law can be found in
the text or background of the Constitution, a documentary palimpsest most of which was drafted
more than two centuries ago”).
385 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 The Republic of
Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776–1826, at 634
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
386 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827); see also supra Part I.B.2
(discussing judicial restraint).
387 Posner, supra note 18, at 593.
388 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
389 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
390 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (“This discussion and our own
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve
the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive.”).
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body of relevant data.” 391 But when the question is what did not
happen in the past, there is danger that the pages of history will be
narrowed and contorted to support a decision based on other grounds.
Candor on the Court must transcend ideology.
The second principle—consistency—builds on the first. Candor
must be present for any standard to be consistently applied.
Consistency requires Courts to first concretely ascertain the level
of deference due to a challenged governmental action. Thus, a court
should look at the basis upon which the action is challenged. This
question looks directly at the rights involved and the constitutional
principle in question. At bottom, and concededly oversimplified, there
are three possible approaches: (1) presumed valid; (2) no
presumption; and (3) presumed invalid. It is (or should be) a generally
accepted principle that in a democratic society congressional actions
are presumed valid. 392 As Justice Stone instructed in Carolene
Products, there are certain situations when that presumption takes a
somewhat narrower scope. 393 For example, when considering suspect
classifications reviewed under strict scrutiny, the Court begins with a
presumption of invalidity and the novelty of a given law is
irrelevant. 394
The purpose of the first question is to determine where the analysis
begins. The challengers to the individual mandate aver that Congress
has exceeded its constitutional authority under the commerce
power. 395 When a challenger asserts that Congress has exceeded its
commerce power, the challenged action is presumed valid. 396 Thus,
challenges to the individual mandate should begin in position one
before the novelty of the act is assessed.
Next, a reviewing court must ask two questions, candidly, and in
sequence: (1) Is the action truly novel, in practice and historic intent
or meaning?; and (2) If so, have “the conditions on which the practice
depended . . . changed in a constitutionally relevant way?” 397 If the
Posner, supra note 18, at 589.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
393 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that
there are certain situations where less deference to the majoritarian legislature is appropriate).
394 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications [imposed by
government] … must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
395 The government also has attempted to defend the individual mandate as a tax; however,
for purposes of this analysis, either provision of the constitution would yield the same outcome
as the law is essentially regulatory in nature.
396 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (citing cases) (“We need not determine
whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”).
397 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 805 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). The relevant
391
392
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action is not truly novel, the import of history was well stated by
Judge Posner: “[I]t is the information itself that should shape our
response to current problems, rather than the past as such; the past is
just a data source.” 398 Because all questions are a matter of degree, if
there is genuine dispute about the novelty the Court should find that
the history is inconclusive. What little evidence there is could,
however, help illuminate the outcome.
To elaborate on the middle ground, Printz is an example of what
the Court should not do when the history is ambiguous. 399 The
majority found that the purported novelty of commandeering state and
local executives elicited a presumption that the Brady Act was
invalid. 400 One interpretation of disputed history should not be so
authoritative. For example, merely deeming Hamilton “the most
expansive expositor of federal power” does not remove his statements
from the history books. 401 In a situation, such as in Printz, where the
historical record is contradictory and ambiguous, the Court should not
narrow and contort the facts to support a finding of novelty. What
evidence there is should either be: (1) deemed inconclusive, which
would not elicit any presumption; or (2) used as a data source, which
depending on the information’s content could support or refute
Congress’s assertion of power.
For disputed history to help refute a power, the history must not be
silence. Put differently, in the “middle ground,” where there is
disagreement about what the history books say, any history used as a
data source should be affirmative historical evidence, not silence or
novelty. For example, if in Printz there where some statements that
suggested commandeering was pernicious but that the historical
record was still ambiguous, those statements could have been used to
increase judicial skepticism of the Brady Act.

“condition” Justice Souter refers to in Alden is the principle that Congress may not infringe on
traditional areas of state sovereignty using the commerce power. Id. at 806 (“Today . . . in light
of Garcia, the law is settled that federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause may
bind the States without having to satisfy a test of undue incursion into state sovereignty.”)
(citation omitted). With Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985), on the books, that test is no longer applicable and state sovereignty concerns are taken
care of by the political process. Thus, “the dearth of prior private federal claims entertained
against the States in state courts does not tell us anything, and reflects nothing but an earlier and
less expansive application of the commerce power.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 806.
398 Posner, supra note 18, at 589.
399 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Printz.
400 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (finding that the novelty of the act
“tend[ed] to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted” to exist in the case).
401 Id. at 915 n.9.
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If the governmental action is undisputedly novel, a second query is
warranted. Is there a reason—social, technological, political, or
legal—that Congress has not taken the action in the past 402 and has
Congress rationally concluded that the action is now necessary? If
both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the base
presumption regarding the action should not change. For example, in
Printz Congress passed “[t]he Brady Act . . . in response to what
Congress described as an ‘epidemic of gun violence.’” 403 The
temporary time period of the Act also illustrates its practical nature.
Even if the Brady Act was truly novel, the presumption of validity
should not have changed.
This is not to say that every law passed can merely include a
congressional finding that “society has changed, and so we needed to
do this” to be held constitutional. That would eviscerate any true
consideration of the law’s constitutionality. Even in the “new era” of
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence 404 the scope of the federal
government’s power continues to be enumerated unless and until a
police power amendment is added to alter Article I, section 8. The
only significance of the question is to determine the weight that the
novelty of the action receives in the analytical equation. Even if
Congress rationally advances a reason for the novelty and shows a
compelling need, the action may nonetheless lie beyond its reach.
But, if Congress does rationally advance a reason, or such a reason is
apparent, then novelty cannot be the basis of the Court’s decision to
strike the act down.
The foregoing discussion of a “standard” is meant to illustrate that
the unprecedented argument is, in the majority of situations, not a
very good one. Imagine, however, that Congress passed a law that
required every person, who can afford it, to carry a smart phone with
internet and email capabilities. The basis of this law could be that
since Congress finds its members enjoy theirs; everyone ought to
enjoy one. And this law would likely increase productivity, and
therefore positively affect the economy. Congress has arguably never
forced every citizen to purchase or keep an item relying on its
commerce power. 405 Despite the ambiguity of the actual historical
402 For example, the action was forbidden or impossible, it could not garner the votes, or
there simply was no need.
403 Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103–344, at 9 (1993)).
404 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.1, 16 (2004).
405 Proponents of the individual mandate have asserted that there is nothing novel about a
forced purchase requirement. See, e.g., Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at
19–20, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14,
2010) (No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT), 2010 WL 3500155 (arguing that federal requirements
targeting market participants to carry insurance are nothing new); Press Release, Ohio Attorney

4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM

586

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

question, assume that the hypothetical statute was a novel exercise of
Congress’s commerce power. The unprecedented argument could
alter the presumption of constitutionality because Congress cannot
rationally assert a reason for the new exercise of its commerce
power—enjoyment of new technology by its members does not
suffice. On the other hand, in section 1501(a) of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act 406 Congress made elaborate findings that the
individual mandate is necessary to improve health care for all
Americans. 407 Such findings are entitled to respect by the judiciary,
even if a particular judge’s subjective judgment—and a large portion
of the country, or an entire political party that has since gained

Gen. Richard Cordray, Ohio Will Not Challenge Health Care Law (Mar., 29, 2010) (on file with
author) (explaining that Congress forced Americans to purchase guns, ammunition and
gunpowder to be prepared for military service).
The government notes that it is not novel for Congress to require market participants to
carry insurance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(e) (2006) (borrowers in flood hazard areas); 30
U.S.C. § 1257(f) (2006) (coal mine operators). The leap in logic, however, is that everyone who
is alive is a participant in the health care market. On that point the Government claims that there
is “[a]bundant empirical evidence [that] shows that nearly everyone consumes health care.”
Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 406, at 17. The government also
avers that eminent domain is similar to the forced purchase of health care. Id. at 20. Those
actions, though similar in a general sense, are not the same. The individual mandate forces all
citizens to purchase insurance whether or not they intend to enter the market voluntarily.
Former Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray asserted that the Second Militia Act of
1792 “required many Americans to make an economic purchase of a gun, ammunition,
gunpowder and a knapsack.” Press Release, supra note 406. The mistake Cordray made is that
the power under which Congress acted was its power to raise and support armies, the nature of
which is much different that the commerce power.
Others have argued that a 1798 act “authorized the creation of a government operated
marine hospital service and mandated that privately employed sailors be required to purchase
health care insurance.” Rick Ungar, Congress Passes Socialized Medicine and Mandates Health
Insurance—In
1798,
Forbes,
(Jan.
17,
2011,
9:08
PM),
http://blogs.forbes.com/rickungar/2011/01/17/congress-passes-socialized-medicine-andmandates-health-insurance-in-1798/ (discussing the Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605).
All is true, except Ungar liberally uses the phrase “required to purchase.” The act taxed
merchant ships coming into port, remitted the tax to the treasury, and the treasury spent the
money to build hospitals and care for sick seaman. Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605 §§
1–3. David Kopel on the Volokh Conspiracy noted as much: “The Act is a solid precedent for
federal involvement in health care, and no precedent at all for a federal mandate to purchase
private products.” David Kopel, An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, The
Volokh Conspiracy, (Apr. 2, 2010, 6:24 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/02/an-act-for-therelief-of-sick-and-disabled-seamen/.
Which side of the above dispute is correct is a question that needs to be assessed
objectively by a historian. It is noteworthy that each commentator and politician referenced
alleged the history books supported their predetermined position without regard to contradictory
data or the context of the facts. This Note does not attempt to resolve the dispute, nor could it.
The purpose of the above discussion is to show the ills of relying on novelty, one of which is the
difficulty of being an objective reader of the history books, another of which is the contortion of
historical facts when they are used as ammunition in a legal dispute.
406 Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
407 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West 2010).
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popularity—is to the contrary. And because the findings are rational,
the presumption of constitutionality should not diminish.
Even a novel and unsupported exercise of power (e.g., the
hypothetical cell phone law) should only operate to increase judicial
skepticism, particularly if the law is regulatory in nature. True novelty
of regulatory laws could increase judicial skepticism, but courts must
accept rational justifications proffered by Congress. Even if the action
is novel and Congress offers no rational reason for the novelty, a
presumption of invalidity is unjustified.
CONCLUSION
Courts should resist the temptation to presume that novel actions
are invalid. That position is analytically flawed and “resemble[s] . . .
the Lochner era’s industrial due process.” 408 When courts use history
authoritatively, the history should be accurate. An accurate reading of
history requires objectivity. The argument advanced in this Note was
put best by Justice Holmes: “We must beware of the pitfall of
antiquarianism, and must remember that for our purposes our only
interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the present.” 409
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